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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article chronicles the Supreme Court’s inconsistent use of an 
avoidance canon in cases construing the substantive rights limitation of 
the Rules Enabling Act (Enabling Act or REA).1  It focuses primarily on 
the avoidance canon as used in cases under the REA branch of the Erie 
 
* Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Associate Professor, The University of Akron School of Law.  I thank 
Kyle S. Passmore and Megan A. Arneson for excellent research contributions and express deep 
gratitude to Donald J. Genetin for his support and assistance. 
 1. Act of June 19, 1934 § 1, Publ. L. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072 (2006)).  
10-GENETIN_44.4_8.7.11_DONE 6/21/2016  2:25 PM 
1068 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:1067 
doctrine2 but also discusses avoidance in other REA contexts.  The 
Article concludes that a reassessment and refocusing of the avoidance 
canon in Enabling Act jurisprudence is necessary.  Avoidance, as used in 
the REA analysis under Erie, has varied over the years, with the Court 
often construing Federal Rules narrowly to avoid a conflict with state 
law,3 (and sometimes construing against any meaning that the text and 
history of the Federal Rule at issue would appear to bear to avoid the 
conflict4), sometimes construing Federal Rules broadly and seeming to 
reach out to find conflict where conflict was not necessary,5 and, most 
recently, engaging avoidance issues directly, but disagreeing about the 
extent and nature of an appropriate rule of avoidance under the REA.6  If 
avoidance is appropriate in Enabling Act jurisprudence, and each of the 
opinions in the Supreme Court’s most recent Erie case, Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,7 appears to 
conclude that some form of avoidance is appropriate,8 the Court should 
identify an appropriate guiding purpose and methodology for avoidance.  
This Article explores the purposes and methodology that should guide 
avoidance in REA cases.     
Through the REA, Congress delegated to the Supreme Court 
authority to promulgate prospective rules to govern procedure in the 
federal courts.  Under this delegation, Congress gave broad authority to 
the Supreme Court to promulgate general rules of practice and procedure 
for the federal courts (Federal Rules or Rules9), and it elevated the status 
 
 2. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  See Donald L. Doernberg, “The 
Tempest”:  Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., The Rules Enabling 
Act Decision that Added to the Confusion—But Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1148 
n.9 (2011) (noting that the term “Erie doctrine” applies to all vertical choice of law issues, including 
those under the REA).   
 3. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7, 437 & n.22 
(1996); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 & n.10 (1980).  See also Semtek Int’l 
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-05 (2001) (construing Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b) narrowly, in part, to avoid abridging, enlarging, or modifying state law and, in part, 
to avoid violating the federalism principle of Erie). 
 4. See, e.g., Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501-05; Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51 & n.10. 
 5. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987); cf. Stewart Org., Inc. 
v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-32 (1988) (construing federal statute broadly when in potential 
conflict with state law). 
 6. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010); see 
infra notes 283-356 and accompanying text. 
 7. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431. 
 8. Id. at 1441-42 & nn.7-8 (majority opinion); id. at 1450-52 & nn.5-6 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1460-69 & nn.2, 8, 10 (Ginsburg, J.,  
dissenting). 
 9. “Federal Rule” or “Rule” refers to rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act process.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (2006). 
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of properly promulgated, i.e., “valid” Federal Rules.  Valid Federal 
Rules will (1) supersede existing, conflicting procedural statutes of 
Congress by reason of the provision of the REA often referred to as the 
“supersession clause”;10 and (2) preempt state procedure by reason of 
the Supremacy Clause11 when the Rules of Decision Act (RDA)12 would 
otherwise call for federal courts to use state law.13   
The Hanna v. Plumer14 decision recognized an important doctrinal 
division between cases presenting potential conflicts between state law 
and judge-made law and those cases presenting apparent conflicts 
between state law and congressional statutes or Federal Rules.15  The 
Hanna Court categorized cases pitting state law and federal judge-made 
law as implicating a “relatively unguided Erie choice” under the RDA.  I 
refer to these cases as requiring an “RDA analysis.”  The Hanna Court 
also recognized that cases involving potential clashes of a federal statute 
or Federal Rule and state law require a different and less searching 
analysis.16  I focus, in this Article, primarily on a subset of this group of 
cases—cases presenting potential conflicts between state law and 
 
 10. The “supersession” clause of the REA authorizes valid Federal Rules to supersede 
existing, conflicting federal statutes:  “All laws in conflict with [Federal Rules promulgated by the 
Supreme Court] shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(b) (2006).  See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks:  A Comment on Paul 
Carrington’s “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 
1036-37, 1044 (1989)  (discussing the supersession clause and Congress’s 1989 attempt to repeal 
that clause); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Powers That Be:  A Reexamination of the Federal 
Courts’ Rulemaking and Adjudicatory Powers in the Context of a Clash of a Congressional Statute 
and a Supreme Court Rule, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 587, 598-606 (2005) [hereinafter Genetin, Powers 
That Be] (discussing the importance of considering Court and congressional rulemaking authority in 
apparent clashes between federal statutes and Federal Rules); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly 
Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis:  A New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between 
Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, 51 EMORY L.J. 677, 726-29, 736-46 (2002) [hereinafter 
Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules] (proposing a framework for 
resolving conflicts between federal statutes and Federal Rules that would include examination of 
Court’s authority under the substantive rights limitation of the REA); Karen Nelson Moore, The 
Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 
1049-53 (1993) (discussing the proposed, but unsuccessful, 1988 amendments to the REA to repeal 
the supersession clause). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 12. The Rules of Decision Act was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 
ch. 20 § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000)).  It provides as follows:  “The 
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of 
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the 
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”  Id. 
 13. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-65, 469-74 (1965). 
 14. Hanna, 380 U.S. 460. 
 15. Id. at 469-74.  See also John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
693, 697-99, 718-21 (1974). 
 16. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463-65, 469-74. 
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Federal Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court under the REA.  I 
refer to the analysis for these conflicts as requiring an “REA analysis.”  
Hanna established that a Federal Rule will be considered valid, for 
purposes of an REA analysis, when it is both constitutional17 and in 
compliance with the substantive rights limitation of the Rules Enabling 
Act,18 which provides that a Federal Rule may not “abridge, enlarge, or 
modify any substantive right.”19   
At the time of the 1934 enactment of the REA, the Court, Congress, 
and federal rulemakers arguably considered substance and procedure to 
be easily separable categories, with procedure serving simply as a means 
of implementing substantive goals.20  Commentators have long since 
concluded, however, that substance and procedure are not mutually 
exclusive.  Instead, they overlap in significant part, thus, rendering the 
substantive rights limitation of the Rules Enabling Act difficult to 
define.21  Indeed, Professor Doernberg has concluded that “[t]hree 
quarters of a century after Congress passed REA, we still lack an 
analytical technique for making the admittedly difficult decisions about 
whether something is substantive or procedural for REA purposes where 
rational arguments exist for either characterization.”22   
 
 17. Id. at 472 (stating that the “constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented 
by the Necessary and Proper Clause)” provides congressional authority to make procedural rules 
“which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally 
capable of classification as either”). 
 18. Id. at 472-74.  The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010), likewise each conceded the 
continuing validity of the Hanna framework for REA issues.  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 
(majority opinion); id. at 1448-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 
id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 19. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 20. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”:  Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and 
the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1612-13 (2008) 
[hereinafter Bone, To Encourage Settlement]; Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process:  
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 893-97 
(1999) [hereinafter, Bone, Process of Making Process]; Thomas O. Main, The Procedural 
Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 804-18 (2010); Stephen N. Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered Common Law:  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 945-47, 962 (1987). 
 21. See, e.g., Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 20, at 900-02; Main, supra note 
20, at 810-11 (concluding that “substance” and “procedure” have been codified as though they were 
dichotomies and “characterized by mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive categories” when 
they, instead, constitute an antinomy, in which some laws can be “both substantive and procedural 
 . . . [and some can] be neither substantive or procedural”); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and 
Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 374-75, 399-
409 (2010). 
 22. Doernberg, supra note 2, at 1180. 
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This is the case, in part, I conclude, because the Court has 
consistently declined to address the issue.  But the failure to derive an 
adequate translation of the substance-procedure distinction for REA 
purposes has not resulted in mere doctrinal untidiness.  The substance-
procedure divide allocates power between Congress and the Supreme 
Court,23 limiting the Court to promulgation of Federal Rules that do not 
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”24  Failure to identify 
an adequate analytical method for determining when a Court-created 
Rule impermissibly impacts substantive rights has led the Court to use 
avoidance techniques in the various scenarios in which the substantive-
procedural distinction arises under the REA:  (1) in the context of the 
Court’s promulgation of Federal Rules;25 (2) in instances in which 
Federal Rules conflict with congressional statutes;26 and (3) in instances 
in which Federal Rules are in potential conflict with state law.27  The 
Court’s use of avoidance in Rule promulgation has resulted in unique 
costs and benefits.  It has permitted promulgation of open-textured Rules 
that permit nominal transsubstantivity of the Rules,28 but this has only 
deferred defining the substantive-procedural divide to the Rule 
 
 23. See, e.g., Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1025-26, 
1106-07, 1113-14 (1982); Burbank, supra note 10, at 1016; Genetin, Conflicts Between 
Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 688; Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking 
“Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 92-
94 (1998). 
 24. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988). 
 25. Professor Burbank indicates that the original Advisory Committee appointed in 1935 “had 
no coherent or consistent view of the limitations imposed by the Act’s procedure/substance 
dichotomy.”  Burbank, supra note 23, at 1132.  Professor Burbank also notes that the Advisory 
Committee “approached [perceived problems of power] without a shared conception of the [REA’s] 
limitations, . . . that the resolution of these problems were, therefore, essentially ad hoc. . . . and [in] 
applying the [REA’s] limitations[,] normative considerations took a back seat to practical 
possibilities.”  Id. at 1132-35; see also id. at 1135-57.    
 26. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1991); Daily Income 
Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 542-44 & n.2 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).  Accord 
Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 731 
(concluding that “if [a] Federal Rule appears to clash with a federal statute because it appears to 
abridge substantive rights impermissibly, the court would, if consistent with the context of statute 
and Rule, prefer a construction in which the Federal Rule would not impermissibly impact 
substantive rights”); Leslie M. Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations of Authority to 
Cancel Statutes in the Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 
442 (2000) (emphasizing that the Court has begun to take the “substantive rights limitation more 
seriously, particularly as a rule of construction, and to read Rules narrowly when necessary to avoid 
infirmity”).   
 27. See infra Sections II.B and II.C.2.a. 
 28. Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules, and 
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1988); Marcus, supra note 21, at 394-95, 416-
21. 
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interpretation context.  Although I focus primarily on the third 
scenario—instances in which a Federal Rule is in potential conflict with 
state law (the REA analysis)—I suggest that attending to each of the 
scenarios that implicate the substantive-procedural divide of the REA is 
important to understanding the limitations of any one.   
The difficulty of articulating an adequate definition of the 
substantive-procedural divide for purposes of the Erie doctrine resulted 
in the Court’s development in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York29 of a 
functional “outcome-determinative” test, which, as interpreted 
uncompromisingly by the Supreme Court, endangered the Federal Rules 
in the context of potentially conflicting state law.30  Indeed, a short 
twelve years after the promulgation of the original Federal Rules, 
Charles E. Clark, the Reporter for the original Advisory Committee and 
the primary drafter of the original Rules, lamented that, given the 
“drastic logic” with which the Supreme Court implemented Guaranty 
Trust’s outcome determinative test, “hardly a one of the heralded 
Federal Rules can be considered safe from attack by shrewd lawyers and 
obedient lower tribunals.”31  The Court did, in some pre-Hanna cases, 
construe the Federal Rule narrowly to avoid a conflict between Federal 
Rule and state law,32 but that avoidance had curious results for the 
Federal Rules.  Construing Rule and state law to conflict meant, under 
the virtually absolute conformity ultimately required under Guaranty 
Trust, that state law would apply,33 but, of course, construing the Federal 
Rule not to conflict also triggered the application of state law.  In effect, 
avoidance may have had some formal benefit in preserving the Federal 
Rule, but, as a practical matter, it was inconsequential.  In either case, 
the Federal Rule would be subordinated, and state law would apply 
alone or in tandem with the Federal Rule.34  Moreover, the Court’s 
decision to defer to state law under the outcome determinative test 
 
 29. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 30. E.g., Bernard C. Gavit, States’ Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 3, 24-26 
(1949); Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 427, 429-34 (1958); 
Edward Lawrence Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan—A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. 
L. REV. 711, 711-12, 717-25 (1950); Arthur John Keeffe et al., Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494, 
506-09, 513, 525 (1948-1949); Charles E. Clark, Cases and Materials on Federal Courts, 36 
CORNELL L.Q. 181, 182-84 (1950) (book review). 
 31. Clark, supra note 30, at 183. 
 32. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949); Palmer v. Hoffman, 
318 U.S. 109, 116-17 (1943).  Cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201-02 
(1956) (using avoidance in apparent conflict between federal statute and state law). 
 33. E.g., Gavit, supra note 30, at 1-3; Hill, supra note 30, at 429-37; Merrigan, supra note 30, 
at 717-18, 723-25; Clark, supra note 30, at 183. 
 34. See infra notes 92-163 and accompanying text. 
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resulted in dual meanings for Federal Rules—one that applied in 
diversity cases and a second in federal question cases.35 
The Court ultimately countered with an overcorrection in Hanna v. 
Plumer,36 creating a test for Rule validity under the REA, in event of a 
conflict between Federal Rule and state law, that established the Federal 
Rules as virtually invulnerable to suggestions that they might 
impermissibly abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights.37  This had 
important consequences for Federal Rules:  It meant that Federal Rules 
could be interpreted uniformly; indeed, the Hanna Court emphasized 
that uniformity of application was “[o]ne of the shaping purposes of the 
Federal Rules.”38  A Federal Rule would be considered valid after 
Hanna if the Rule “‘really regulate[d] procedure,[ ] the judicial process 
for enforcing the rights and duties recognized by substantive law, and for 
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of 
them,’”39 an illusory standard that drew immediate and consistent 
criticism40 (but which a plurality of the Supreme Court has reaffirmed in 
the Shady Grove opinion41).  The hoped-for uniformity, however, has 
not materialized.  
In the post-Hanna context, avoidance could play a major role as the 
Court itself illustrated in the Hanna opinion.42  Indeed, in post-Hanna 
cases, the Court has invoked an avoidance canon fairly often, this time to 
prevent the potential overprotection of the Federal Rules (and 
 
 35. See, e.g., Gavit, supra note 30, at 3, 25-26; Merrigan, supra note 30, at 717-19, 721. 
 36. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 37. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 1637, 1643 (1998) (noting that “overzealous application of Hanna . . . [in Burlington Northern 
Railroad Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1987) and Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 
U.S. 22, 29-32 (1988)] was so stark that one might be forgiven for becoming cynical; the tie-breaker 
in vertical choice of law was that the federal provision wins by invocation of Hanna”); John A. 
Lynch, Jr., Federal Procedure and Erie:  Saving State Litigation Reform Through Comparative 
Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 289 (2008) (describing the “‘really regulates procedure’” 
principle of Hanna as “a test the rules cannot fail”). 
 38. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-73 (quoting Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 
764 (5th Cir. 1963)).  See also Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5 (indicating that the “cardinal 
purpose” of Congress in enacting the REA was “the development of a uniform and consistent 
system of rules governing federal practice and procedure”). 
 39. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 40. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1452 n.7 
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing and approving 
scholarly criticism of the standard).  See also Doernberg, supra note 2, at 1173-74, 1178-79; John C. 
McCoid, II, Hanna v. Plumer:  The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REV. 884, 887, 901-04 
(1965). 
 41. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442-43 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and 
Sotomayor, J.). 
 42. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 & n.12. 
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consequent underprotection of state substantive law) under the Rule-
protective standard for validity established in Hanna.  The Court’s 
construction of the scope of a Federal Rule—or whether the Rule 
“covered the point in dispute”43—however, has varied in post-Hanna 
cases, and its use of an avoidance canon of Rule interpretation has been 
uneven.  Commentators have suggested, moreover, that the Court’s 
recent use of an avoidance canon44 not only avoids conflict between 
Federal Rule and state law, but it essentially rewrites the Federal Rules 
at issue in order to avoid a conflict with state law.45  They have also 
concluded that the Court’s use of avoidance has taken on an ad hoc 
quality that provides little guidance to lower courts.46  A slim majority of 
the Supreme Court has signaled in Shady Grove that it will abandon this 
use of the avoidance canon,47 but the remaining justices would pursue 
avoidance out of respect for important state interests and regulatory 
policies.48   
In summary, in a post-Hanna world, much rides on a court’s 
determination of whether the scope of a Federal Rule, “when fairly 
construed,” is “‘sufficiently broad’ to cause a ‘direct collision’ with the 
state law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue before the court,’ thereby 
leaving no room for the operation of that law.”49  The “conflict” decision 
 
 43. Id. at 470.  Whether a Rule and state law are in conflict has been variously articulated, 
including “whether when fairly construed, the scope of [the] Federal Rule . . . is ‘sufficiently broad’ 
to cause a ‘direct collision’ with the state law or, implicitly to ‘control the issue’ before the court, 
thereby leaving no room for the operation of [state] law.”  Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987).   
 44. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-05 (2001); Gasperini v. 
Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436-37 & n.22 (1996). 
 45.  See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules:  An 
Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 708, 727 (2006); see 
also Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV.  1027, 1042-46 (2002); Ralph U. Whitten, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. 
Allstate Insurance Co.:  Justice Whitten, Nagging in Part and Declaring a Pox on All Houses, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 118-24 (2010). 
 46. See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 708, 727 (noting that the Court has 
resorted to “case-by-case determinations” and to “ad hoc departure[s] from the literal terms of a 
Federal Rule and its commonly understood meaning” to resolve Erie issues implicating the Federal 
Rules); Armando Gustavo Hernandez, The Head-On Collision of Gasperini and the Derailment of 
Erie:  Exposing the Futility of the Accommodation Doctrine, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191, 192-95, 
223 (2010).  
 47. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1440-42 & 
nn.7-8 (2010) (majority opinion); id. at 1451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 48. Id. at 1461-69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 49. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987) (citing Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 & n.9 (1980); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1965)). 
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mediates between use of the RDA analysis, which virtually assures 
primacy of state law, and use of an REA analysis, which, under either 
the “really regulates procedure” principle of Hanna50 or the seemingly 
more searching inquiry into whether a Rule “affects[s] litigants’ 
substantive rights” more than “incidentally” under Burlington Northern 
Railroad Co. v. Woods,51 has virtually assured that the Federal Rule will 
preempt state law.  Two strands of avoidance have emerged in the 
Court’s recent REA cases under Erie:  (1) avoidance based primarily on 
an intent to “interpre[t] the federal rules to avoid conflict with important 
state regulatory policies”52 and sometimes incorporating a type of 
interest balancing approach; and (2) avoidance resembling more nearly 
the canon to construe against serious constitutional doubts and guided by 
goals of preventing “arguabl[e] violat[ion] of the jurisdictional limitation 
of the Rules Enabling Act” and violation of the “federalism principle[s] 
of Erie.”53   
I reach two primary conclusions regarding the avoidance canon in 
this Article.  Preliminarily, an avoidance canon is inadequate, standing 
alone, to satisfactorily divide substance and procedure for purposes of 
the REA.  An avoidance principle necessarily presupposes some shared 
understanding of the standard to be avoided.  Although commentators 
have celebrated the Court’s use of an avoidance canon of Rule 
interpretation as signaling the Court’s intent to take substantive rights in 
the Rules Enabling Act more seriously,54 the Court must develop an 
administrable means of applying the substance-procedure distinction of 
the REA.  Identifying a proper standard is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but among the likely candidates are proposals of Justice Scalia 
and Justice Stevens in the Shady Grove opinion, the standard established 
 
 50. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464. 
 51. Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5-6 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464-65; Miss. Publ’g 
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946); 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4509, at 145-46 (1982)). 
 52. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436-37 & n.22 (1996).  See 
also Lynch, supra note 37, at 321-26 (proposing comparative impairment for resolving conflicts 
between Federal Rules and state law, in the limited context of state litigation reform legislation); 
McCoid, supra note 40, at 912-14 (suggesting that the Hanna Court should have used a comparative 
impairment analysis).   
 53. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503-04 (2001). 
 54. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power:  The Role of Congress, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1712-14, 1736-37 (2004); Genetin, Powers That Be, supra note 10, at 
592; Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 728 & 
n.241; Kelleher, supra note 26, at 442. 
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in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods,55 and recent suggestions 
in scholarly commentary.56   
Second, the varying rationales for avoidance should be unified and 
recalibrated to serve the separation of powers goals that underlie 
Congress’s inclusion of the substantive rights limitation in the REA.  I 
conclude that the Court should develop an avoidance canon analogous to 
the so-called “serious doubts” or “modern” avoidance canon of statutory 
construction that prefers an interpretation of a statute, when possible, 
that will avoid serious constitutional doubts.57  Correspondingly, in the 
REA context, the Court should construe a Federal Rule that is in 
potential conflict with state law to avoid serious questions regarding a 
Rule’s violation of the substantive rights limitation of the REA, but only 
if there is a plausible interpretation of the Rule that would permit 
avoidance.  In determining whether avoidance is permissible, the Court 
should, in line with its use of avoidance in other Enabling Act 
contexts,58 construe a Rule in accord with the Rule’s text, history, and 
purposes, as set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes, reports, and 
other materials.59 
 
 55. 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987). 
 56. Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality in Shady Grove would adhere to a standard of 
whether a Rule “‘really regulat[e][s] procedure.’” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and 
Sotomayor, J.).  Justice Stevens, in concurrence in Shady Grove, suggests that the substantive rights 
limitation precludes Federal Rules that “would displace a state law that is procedural in the ordinary 
use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope 
of the state-created right.”  Id. at 1452-53 & n.8-9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment).   In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, the Court held that “[t]he cardinal 
purpose of Congress in authorizing development of a uniform and consistent system of rules 
governing federal practice and procedure suggests that Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ 
substantive rights do not violate . . . [the substantive rights] provision if reasonably necessary to 
maintain the integrity of that system of rules.”  Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5.  Professor 
Doernberg submits two suggestions, which he refers to as the “elements” approach and the 
“behavioral” approach, that are each likely candidates for this position.  Doernberg, supra note 2, at 
1185-86.  Under the “elements” approach, the court would consider “whether the state law and 
Federal Rule at issue tend to establish or negate an element of the claimant’s cause of action or a 
defense on the merits.”  Id. at 1185.  A court following the “behavioral” approach would ask 
“whether, before the litigation began and assuming the parties were fully aware of the competing 
rules, they would rationally have ordered their conduct in accord with one of the rules.”  Id. at 1186.  
 57. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
109, 138-39 (2010); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 15 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997); 
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial 
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1575-76 (2000). 
 58. See infra notes 225-61 and accompanying text. 
 59. Compare Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation:  Interpreting the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV.  1099, 1124-42, 1147 (2002) (suggesting that the nature of 
the Enabling Act process and reality of the rulemaking process counsel restraint in Court 
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Section II of this Article traces the Court’s use of an avoidance 
canon in Erie, REA cases60 and in non-Erie, REA cases.61  Section II 
dwells on the pre-Hanna period, reminding that the Court’s use of 
outcome-determinative principles under Guaranty Trust minimized the 
pre-Hanna role of avoidance,62 subordinated Federal Rules to state law, 
and resulted in differing interpretations of Federal Rules in diversity and 
federal question cases.  Section II then examines avoidance in post-
Hanna, Erie cases.  In these cases, the Court has generally construed 
Federal Rules narrowly with sensitivity to important state interests and 
regulatory policies.  This federalism focus for avoidance permits state 
law to override Federal Rules and permits the “two plain meanings” for 
Federal Rules that commentators disparage in the Court’s post-Hanna 
avoidance decisions.63  It, thus, permits replication, Rule-by-Rule, of 
Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative results—subordination of 
Federal Rules and dual interpretations of Federal Rules in diversity and 
federal question cases.  Section II, finally, examines the Court’s use of 
avoidance in non-Erie, REA cases in which the Court has generally used 
serious doubts avoidance and has adopted saving constructions of 
Federal Rules that are more faithful to Rule text and Rule purposes and 
history as set forth in Advisory Committee materials. 
Section III examines the views in the plurality, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions in Shady Grove regarding the extent and nature of an 
appropriate avoidance canon.  In these opinions, the Justices draw on 
elements of the Court’s historical use of avoidance in REA cases to 
suggest three competing avoidance principles.  Justice Scalia, in dicta, 
proposes a type of “classical” or “narrow” avoidance;64 Justice Stevens, 
in concurrence, suggests a broader avoidance canon modeled on “serious 
 
construction of Federal Rules, that the Court consider the Enabling Act process, and that it “give[] 
authoritative weight to the Advisory Committee Notes”), with Moore, supra note 10, at 1047-53 
(1993) (proposing that the Supreme Court use an active or dynamic interpretation of the Rules it 
promulgates).  See also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 48-49 (2010) (advocating that unless a 
Federal Rule “actually makes a policy choice that Congress has had an opportunity to review 
[following its prescribed Enabling Act process] . . . the role that federal common law plays in 
providing content that the rulemakers did not prospectively entertain should be recognized” and 
emphasizing as well that “[m]any, if not most, of the Federal Rules are charters for discretionary 
decisionmaking, setting boundaries and leaving the actual choices to federal trial judges”). 
 60. See infra notes 92-163 and 188-222 and accompanying text. 
 61. See infra notes 224-61 and accompanying text. 
 62. Although the Court limited the outcome determinative principle of Guaranty Trust in its 
decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), the Court did not 
use avoidance in REA cases between the Byrd and Hanna cases. 
 63. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 64. See infra notes 283-323 and accompanying text. 
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doubts” principles, which would counsel avoidance if the most natural 
construction of a Rule would raise serious doubts about the Rule’s 
validity under the REA;65 and Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, advocates 
avoidance based almost solely on respect for important state interests 
and regulatory policies.66   
In Section IV, I conclude that avoidance in REA cases under Erie 
should be based on separation of powers principles and should 
incorporate a serious doubts methodology.  This includes aspects of 
Justice Stevens’s approach in Shady Grove, but I conclude, as well, that 
the range of permissible “saving” constructions should be limited to 
Rule interpretations that are consonant with a Rule’s text and its history 
and purposes as revealed in Advisory Committee Notes and other 
materials.  I also discuss the advantages of a serious doubts avoidance 
model for Rule construction over the models suggested by Justices 
Scalia and Ginsburg.     
II.  AVOIDANCE IN ENABLING ACT CASES 
In many ways, avoidance has, from the very enactment of the Rules 
Enabling Act, been the defining characteristic of the Court’s 
construction of the substantive-procedural divide in the REA, in general, 
and in the REA branch of the Erie doctrine, in particular.  Professor 
Burbank relates that, from the start, the original rulemakers lacked a 
coherent view of the REA’s dividing line between substance and 
procedure.67  In promulgating the original Federal Rules pursuant to the 
REA, the rulemakers, thus, avoided the substantive-procedural divide, in 
some instances, by incorporating state law68 or existing federal law 
(based on federal statutes and federal common law)69 into a Federal Rule 
and, in other instances, by promulgating general Rules that conferred 
broad, general discretion on trial judges.70  In amending the Rules, 
contemporary rulemakers often avoid promulgating Rules that might be 
 
 65. See infra notes 324-47 and accompanying text. 
 66. See infra notes 348-56 and accompanying text. 
 67. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1132-37, 1145-46. 
 68. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1145-47.   
 69. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1147-57. 
 70. Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules:  The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. 
REV. 319, 324 (2008) [hereinafter Bone, Making Effective Rules]; Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A 
Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1967-68, 1972-73 (2007) 
[hereinafter Bone, Who Decides?]. 
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construed as substantive71 and promulgate discretionary, open-textured 
Rules that leave normative decisions to trial court judges.72  
Similarly, in construing potential Federal Rule-state law conflicts 
under Erie, the Court has often avoided addressing the substantive-
procedural divide.  This Section traces the history of the Court’s use of 
avoidance in Enabling Act cases.  Section II.A lays the groundwork by 
discussing the substantive rights limitation of the REA.  Sections II.B 
and C  examine the avoidance canon, as the Court has employed it in 
pre-Hanna, Erie cases; in its post-Hanna, Erie cases; and in other 
Enabling Act contexts.  Section II.B reveals that, under the outcome-
determinative standard of Guaranty Trust, Federal Rules appeared 
uniformly to yield to conflicting state law, and the Court occasionally 
used avoidance as a means of protecting the Federal Rule.73  Section II.C 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court ultimately reaffirmed the 
superiority of valid Federal Rules over conflicting state law in Hanna v. 
Plumer and set a fairly high bar for finding Rules invalid under the 
REA.74  Rather than using Hanna’s stringent standard to override 
conflicting state law, however, the Court has used avoidance based on 
federalism principles and construing Rules narrowly (and sometimes 
contrary to text and accompanying Advisory Committee Notes) to find 
that Federal Rule and state law do not conflict.  This results in state 
law’s controlling under an RDA analysis and may, Rule-by-Rule, 
reintroduce the outcome determinative results of Guaranty Trust.  
Section II concludes by showing that this method of avoidance has 
threatened the integrity of the Federal Rules as a coherent system, and 
that the method varies from the avoidance canon the Court uses in its 
non-Erie, REA cases.     
A. The Substantive Rights Limitation of the REA 
In the original Enabling Act, Congress delegated authority to the 
Supreme Court to promulgate general rules of practice and procedure for 
the lower federal courts, but it limited that authority to promulgation of 
Rules that would not “abridge, enlarge or modify any litigant’s 
 
 71. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 21, at 413-14. 
 72. See, e.g., Bone, Making Effective Rules, supra note 70, at 326-37; Bone, Who Decides?, 
supra note 70, at 1974-75; Burbank, supra note 28, at 715; Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of 
Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1473-75 (1987) (book review); Stephen N. Subrin, The 
Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure:  An Essay on Adjusting the “One-Size-Fits-All” 
Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.  377, 391 (2010). 
 73. See infra notes 92-163 and accompanying text. 
 74. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-74 (1965). 
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substantive rights.”75  The prohibition on Court-made Rules that 
impermissibly impact substantive rights has been modified by 
amendment to the REA and today provides as follows: 
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of 
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United 
States district courts . . . .   
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right. . . .76 
Professor Burbank’s scholarship has been instrumental in clarifying 
that the substantive rights prohibition was originally included in the 
REA as a separation or allocation of powers provision.77  The 
substantive rights limitation was intended to separate the permissible 
bounds of the Supreme Court’s prospective procedural rulemaking from 
the impermissible substantive realm, in which Court rulemaking would 
trench impermissibly on Congress’s substantive lawmaking 
prerogative.78  The REA, thus, delegates Congress’s prospective 
procedural lawmaking authority to the Court,79 but it also confines Court 
rulemaking to the procedural and, moreover, to procedural Rules that do 
not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”80   
Originally, there was little need for Congress to patrol this divide 
carefully.  Congress, the Court, and commentators shared a vision of a 
 
 75. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)). 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 77. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 23, at 1025-26, 1106-14. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Through the REA, Congress delegated to the Supreme Court its power to create 
procedural rules for the federal courts.  The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress has 
the power, under Articles I and III of the Constitution, to make procedural rules.  Article I 
authorizes Congress to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, 
cl. 9, and also authorizes Congress to enact all laws necessary and proper to execute the powers 
vested in it by the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  Article III also permits Congress 
to “vest[]” “judicial Power . . . in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  The Supreme Court has also long recognized that 
Congress has the power to delegate procedural rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court.  See, 
e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386-88 (1989); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 42-45 (1825). 
 80. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 23, at 1107-08 (concluding that the first sentence of the 
REA, which authorizes the Court to promulgate “general rules of practice and procedure,” 28 
U.S.C. § 2072(a), imposes significant, procedural restrictions on Court rulemaking and that the 
second sentence, which contains the prohibition that Rules may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), is not an independent limitation, but is essentially 
“surplusage”). 
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fairly abrupt divide between substance and procedure.81  Procedure, they 
concluded, was different in kind from and subservient to substantive 
law.82  The Supreme Court, moreover, enjoyed expertise in procedural 
matters.  Thus, for nearly forty years after the enactment of the REA, 
Congress entered a period of rulemaking passivity, in which it deferred 
to the procedural expertise of the Supreme Court and generally declined 
to enact substantive legislation that included procedural provisions, 
declined to enact amendments to Federal Rules promulgated by the 
Court, and declined to object to Federal Rules promulgated by the 
Supreme Court. 83   
In the then-existing climate of congressional forbearance in 
procedural rulemaking, the role of the substantive rights provision in 
creating a boundary that allocated prospective lawmaking authority 
between the Court and Congress blurred.  Court Rules were generally 
considered the equivalent of statutes.84  Moreover, given Congress’s 
acquiescence in Court rulemaking, conflicts between congressional 
statutes and Federal Rules, which I have previously referred to as 
“statute-Rule conflicts,”85 rarely arose.86  In the few instances in which 
such conflicts did arise, the question of the Court’s rulemaking authority 
under the substantive rights provision of the REA, though not 
nonexistent, assumed lesser importance, not only because of the relative 
infrequence of statute-Rule conflicts, but also because of the prevailing 
assumptions of Court expertise and broad rulemaking authority and the 
seeming triviality of the issues that arose.87   
 
 81. Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 70, at 1971-72; Bone, Process of Making Process, supra 
note 20, at 894-96; Subrin, supra note 20, at  945-47, 962.  Toward the end of this time period, the 
idea of a strict separation between substance and procedure was receding, but the proponents of the 
REA persisted in seeking passage of a bill premised on a dichotomy between substance and 
procedure.  See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 23, at 1136 & n.540. 
 82. See, e.g., Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 20, at 894-96. 
 83. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1001 (3d ed. 2010); Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra 
note 10, at 694-96. 
 84. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 83, § 1030 & n.1; Genetin, Conflicts Between 
Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 680-82, 701-05 (discussing how courts 
typically resolve clashes between a congressional statute and Federal Rule through an “implied 
repeal analysis,” in which the courts often treat the statute and Rule as though they were two 
provisions created by the same lawmaker, rather than provisions of lawmakers with uneven 
authority). 
 85. Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 
681. 
 86. Id. at 751. 
 87. Id. at 751 & n.343 (indicating that the few applications of the supersession clause included 
appellate rules that superseded legislation regarding time to appeal, whether printing costs were 
taxable, and certain fees in admiralty appeals).  Professors Burbank and Wolff suggest as well that 
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During the forty years in which congressional procedural passivity 
limited the importance of the substantive rights provision as an arbiter of 
potential congressional statute-Federal Rule conflicts, however, the role 
of the substantive rights provision of the REA was assuming increasing 
importance in Erie cases.  Although federalism interests are not 
irrelevant in inquiries regarding the Court’s compliance with the 
substantive rights limitation of the REA, they are furthered not as a 
primary purpose of the REA’s substantive rights limitation, but as a 
secondary effect of that allocation.88  That is, to the extent that Congress 
does not enact legislation in an area and to the extent that the Court does 
not promulgate Rules, or rulemaking would intrude on Congress’s 
substantive legislative prerogative (e.g., to the extent that Court Rules 
would abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right), state law, if 
any, will govern.  Of course, in some cases, the Federal Rule at issue 
may be augmented by federal common law, which would also override 
state law.89  Nevertheless, at least in part because of the few 
opportunities, from 1938 to the 1970s, to consider the separation of 
powers purposes of the REA in confrontations between congressional 
statutes and Federal Rules,90 the stage was set for the Court, in its Erie 
cases, to key on the secondary federalism aspects of the substantive 
rights limitation.  Indeed, federalism purposes have long animated the 
Court’s avoidance canon in Erie cases,91 and it is only in the plurality 
and concurring opinions of Shady Grove that the Court has begun to 
deemphasize federalism interests in its avoidance analysis.   
B. The Avoidance Canon in Erie’s Pre-Hanna Cases 
In pre-Hanna cases featuring Federal Rule-state law conflicts, the 
Supreme Court used an avoidance canon sporadically to avoid resolving 
substantive-procedural issues, but avoidance had little practical 
significance.  Working to offset the practical import of any avoidance 
 
the Court may have believed that a federalism perspective could enhance its rulemaking power and 
the integrity of the Rules.  See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 59, at 29. 
 88. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1025-26, 1106-12. 
 89. Burbank and Wolff, supra note 59, at 29; Genetin, Powers That Be, supra note 10, at 591-
92, 610-12.   
 90. Henry P. Chandler, Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System 1922-1947, 31 F.R.D. 
307, 514-15 (1963); Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 
435, 443 & n.40 (1958); Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, 
supra note 10, at 751 & n.351.  
 91. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503-04 (2001); Gasperini v. 
Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 & n.7, 436-37 (1996); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 
446 U.S. 740, 751-52 & nn.12-13 (1980); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965). 
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canon of Rule interpretation were two significant decisions that put the 
integrity of the Federal Rules as a coherent unit in jeopardy—Guaranty 
Trust Co. v. York,92 which introduced the outcome-determinative 
principle that would dominate Erie jurisprudence until 1958,93 and 
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,94 which seemed to 
apply outcome determination in the context of a Federal Rule and 
conclude that state law would control.95  After Guaranty Trust, 
avoidance became the better part of Rule validity in pre-Hanna cases.96  
It was an ineffective kind of avoidance that the Court adopted, however, 
that could not protect the Federal Rule as a practical matter:  If a Federal 
Rule were construed narrowly to avoid conflict with state law, the 
Federal Rule survived as a formal matter, but state law controlled or 
both Federal Rule and state-law controlled because, absent a conflict, 
courts applied state law alone or in conjunction with the Federal Rule.97  
If, however, Federal Rule and state law did conflict, the state law also 
controlled or seemed to control, based on application of Guaranty 
Trust’s outcome determinative formulation.98  Thus, the Federal Rules 
were consistently on the losing end of the tossup in a paradigmatic 
heads-I-win, tails-you-lose scenario.  The uniformity, predictability, and 
coherence of procedure in the federal courts sought by Congress through 
the Federal Rules were immediately imperiled, and Judge Charles 
Clark’s lamentation that “hardly a one of the heralded Federal Rules can 
be considered safe from attack” reflected reality.99  
 
 92. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 93. In 1958, the Supreme Court reduced the impact of Guaranty Trust’s outcome-
determinative principle when it introduced an interest balancing approach in Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 94. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
 95. Id. at 533-34.  See, e.g., Ralph U. Whitten, Erie and the Federal Rules:  A Review and 
Reappraisal After Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1987). 
 96. E.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949); cf. Bernhardt 
v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956) (employing avoidance in a case of apparent 
federal statute-state law conflict); see also id. at 207-08 (Frankfurter, J, concurring); accord Gavit, 
supra note 30, at 1, 3; Hill, supra note 30, at 429-34 (emphasizing that Federal Rules and statutes 
were imperiled under rigid application of outcome-determinative principles); Merrigan, supra note 
30, at 711-12, 721-23. 
 97. E.g., Cohen, 337 U.S. at 555-56 (state and federal law control); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 
U.S. 109, 116-17 (1943) (state law controls). 
 98. E.g., Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).  See also 
Whitten, supra note 95, at 9-12 (noting that “[o]ne cannot read the Ragan opinion without drawing 
the conclusion that the Court viewed the case as one in which a Federal Rule conflicted with state 
law, and in which Erie required application of the state provision”). 
 99. Clark, supra note 30, at 183-84.  See also infra notes 115-63 and accompanying text.   
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The Court first used avoidance in Rule interpretation in the 1943 
case of Palmer v. Hoffman,100 at a time (before the Guaranty Trust 
decision) when the Court approached Erie issues by determining if an 
issue was substantive or procedural.101  Avoidance mattered.  If the issue 
were deemed procedural, the Federal Rule would prevail over state law 
in event of conflict;102 if deemed substantive, state law would govern in 
event of conflict.103  In Palmer,104 the Supreme Court avoided finding a 
conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), which seemed to 
catalogue affirmative defenses, and state law, which allocated the burden 
of proving contributory negligence.  The Court determined that the issue 
of burden of proof was substantive.105  Absent avoidance, state law 
would have controlled.  Avoidance was, thus, used to shield the Federal 
Rule, rather than to protect “important state interests” or “regulatory 
policies.”106  The Court’s analysis paralleled what scholars have referred 
to, in the constitutional avoidance context as “narrow” or “classical 
avoidance,”107 under which, if there are two possible constructions of a 
statute, one of which would render the statute unconstitutional and the 
other of which would not, the court will adopt the interpretation that will 
not result in unconstitutionality.108  The classical avoider does not avoid 
the constitutional (or, in REA cases, the substantive rights) decision, but 
 
 100. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
 101. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 210-12 (1939).  
 102. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1941). 
 103. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 308 U.S. at 210-12. 
 104. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
 105. Id. at 116-17. 
 106. Some contemporary Supreme Court cases incorrectly reference Palmer v. Hoffman for the 
proposition that it evidences avoidance to protect important state interests and regulatory policies.  
See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1462, 1468 
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 107. The so-called “narrow” or “classical” avoidance is also referred to as the 
“unconstitutionality” canon.  It provides that when “one interpretation of a statute would render it 
unconstitutional, the court should adopt any plausible interpretation that would avoid the question.”  
See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 57, at 138-39 (citing John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson 
Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1496 (1997) and referring to the canon as the 
“unconstitutionality” canon to distinguish it from the “doubts” version of avoidance); Vermeule, 
supra note 57, at 1949 (referring to the narrower avoidance principle as “classical” avoidance and 
noting that the difference between “classical” and “modern” avoidance is “that the former requires 
the court to determine that one plausible interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, 
while the latter requires only a determination that one plausible reading might be unconstitutional” 
(emphasis in original)); Young, supra note 57, at 1578-79 (using the terms “classical” and 
“modern”). 
 108. Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1959; see also Barrett, supra note 57, at 138-39; Young, 
supra note 57, at 1578-79. 
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decides that question and then interprets the statute, if possible, to avoid 
an unconstitutional construction.109   
The Palmer Court employed an analogous avoidance methodology.  
The district court had allocated to the defendant the burden of proving 
contributory negligence, although the defendant contended state law 
would have burdened the plaintiff.110  The Plaintiff defended the district 
court’s decision in the Supreme Court by arguing that Rule 8(c) made 
contributory negligence an affirmative defense in the federal courts.111  
Rule 8(c) could have been so interpreted.  It provided that “[i]n 
responding to a pleading a party must affirmatively state any avoidance 
or affirmative defense, including . . . contributory negligence. . . .”112  
With a scant, one-sentence explanation, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s 
argument and construed Rule 8(c) to avoid conflict with state law, 
holding that Rule 8(c) did not allocate the burden of proving 
contributory negligence, but dealt only with the manner of pleading.113  
By construing Rule 8(c) as a rule of pleading only, the Court did avoid 
the conflict between Federal Rule and state law.  Having lost touch with 
the context of the Palmer case, current courts will use the case to support 
construing Federal Rules narrowly to protect important state interests.114  
In fact, narrow construction of the Federal Rule in Palmer prevented 
Rule 8(c) from yielding to the state law’s conflicting apportionment of 
burden of proof. 
Two important cases, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,115 and Ragan v. 
Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co.,116 fundamentally altered the 
Erie landscape before the Court returned to avoidance techniques in 
Rule interpretation.  These cases would also stall any significant 
development of avoidance in pre-Hanna cases by rendering the 
avoidance decision of formal import only.   
Given the difficulty of dividing substance and procedure, the 
Supreme Court, in Guaranty Trust, embraced avoidance.117  It adopted a 
functional approach, ultimately referred to as the “outcome-
 
 109. The “classical” avoidance doctrine has largely been supplanted by “modern” or “serious 
doubts” avoidance that permits a court to seek a less preferable construction of a statute if the most 
natural construction might be unconstitutional.  Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1949. 
 110. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116 (1943). 
 111. Id. at 117. 
 112. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 113. Palmer, 318 U.S. at 117. 
 114. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
 115. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 116. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
 117. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 107-10. 
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determinative” approach, that would serve the “policy” of Erie118 and 
would make unnecessary determination of the substantive-procedural 
divide.  Emphasizing that the policy of the Erie opinion “touche[d] 
vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between State and 
federal courts,”119 the Guaranty Trust Court concluded that the intent of 
the Erie decision was to ensure uniformity of outcome in federal and 
state courts: 
In essence, the intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, in all 
cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of 
the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation 
in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal 
rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a 
State court.120 
The Guaranty Trust Court, thus, made unnecessary Erie’s inquiries 
into whether there was federal power to make law in a particular case 
and, if so, whether that power was appropriately exercised by Congress 
or the Supreme Court in the case at issue.  It replaced those questions 
with an inquiry (under the “policy” of Erie) into whether use of federal 
law would be outcome determinative in the particular litigation.  
Although the language of the Guaranty Trust decision would have 
permitted a more nuanced choice of federal or state law,121 the Court 
applied its outcome-determinative approach inflexibly, concluding 
regularly that federal courts sitting in diversity were to be considered as 
“only another court of the State”122 and, thus, that differing federal 
procedure must yield to state law.  The Court’s invocation of the 
 
 118. Id. at 109-10. 
 119. Id. at 109. 
 120. Id.  
 121. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1965). 
 122. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108.  See also Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 
538 (1949) (quoting Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947)); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & 
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949) (“If recovery could not be had in the state court, it should 
be denied in the federal court”); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949) 
(noting that Erie and its progeny established a “far-reaching change in the relation of state and 
federal courts and the application of state law in the latter whereby in diversity cases the federal 
court administers the state system of law in all except details related to its own conduct of 
business”) (citation omitted)); Angel, 330 U.S. at 187.  The Supreme Court, in Bernhardt v. 
Polygraphic Co. of America articulated the conformity requirement as follows: 
The federal court enforces the state-created right by rules of procedure which it has 
acquired from the Federal Government and which therefore are not identical with those 
of the state courts.  Yet, in spite of that difference in procedure, the federal court 
enforcing a state-created right in a diversity case is, as we said in Guaranty Trust Co. of 
New York v. York, . . . in substance “only another court of the State.”  
350 U.S. 198, 202-03 (1956). 
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“outcome-determinative” approach to bridging the substance-procedure 
divide in Erie cases focused on the desire to ensure vertical uniformity—
a uniform outcome for state-law claims, whether tried in the state or 
federal courts—and caused many to doubt the validity, at least in 
diversity actions, of the newly created Federal Rules that had been 
intended to establish uniform, simple, and predictable procedural Rules 
for the federal courts.123   
Guaranty Trust, of course, did not deal with a potential conflict 
between Federal Rule and state law.  In this pre-Hanna era,124 however, 
rigorous application of Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative 
principle threatened the validity of the nascent Federal Rules.125  As 
Professor Alfred Hill wrote, “Inevitably the question arose whether the 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could stand if they 
tended to promote an outcome at variance with the probable outcome in 
a state court . . . .”126  The Court’s 1949 decision in Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co.,127 cemented the grounds for concern, and, in 
fact, put at risk the integrity of the Rules.128   
In Ragan, the Supreme Court seemed to subordinate Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 3 to state law, by applying outcome determinative 
 
 123. For discussion of the purposes of the original Federal Rules, see Burbank, supra note 23, 
at 1024-25; Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 
690 & n.67.  For an overview of the commentary despairing that Federal Rules could be effective in 
diversity after Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) and the 
companion cases of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) and Woods v. 
Interstate Realty, Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), see Gavit, supra note 30, at 1, 3, 24-26; Hill, supra note 
30, at 432-35 (cataloguing uncertainty regarding the validity of federal statutes and at least the 
following Federal Rules in instances of potentially inconsistent state law, following the Court’s 
decision in Ragan:  Rule 15(c) (relation back of amended pleadings), Rule 6 (time computation 
principles), Rule 25(a) (substitution of parties), Rule 41(b) (dismissal of action for nonprosecution), 
Rule 13 (counterclaims and crossclaims), Rule 18(b) (joinder of principal claim with contingent 
claim), Rule 2 (joinder of legal and equitable claims), Rule 23(a)(3) (“spurious” class actions), Rule 
43(a) (admissibility of evidence), Rule 35 (mental and physical exams), Rules 38 and 39 (denying a 
jury trial when a conflicting state law would permit jury trial), Rule 17(b) (capacity of certain types 
of persons to sue and be sued), Rule 23(b) (actions by shareholders), Rule 4(d) (substituted 
service)); Merrigan, supra note 30, at 711-12, 717-25; Keeffe et al., supra note 30, at 506-09, 513, 
525; Clark, supra note 30, at 182-84. 
 124. Hanna solidified the difference between the Court’s rulemaking, which is based on 
congressionally delegated authority, and Court common law or practice, and it released “valid” 
Federal Rules, i.e., Rules that complied with the Constitution and the REA’s substantive rights 
provision, from the gravitational pull of the RDA analysis, which applies to cases subject to the 
“relatively unguided Erie choice.”  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471; see also Ely, supra note 15, at 697-700, 
718-22. 
 125. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
 126. Hill, supra note 30, at 429. 
 127. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
 128. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
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principles.129  At issue was a potential conflict between Rule 3, which 
provided that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with 
the court,”130 and state law, which provided that “[a]n action shall be 
deemed commenced within the meaning of this article, as to each 
defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him. . . .”131  
The plaintiff had filed a diversity action in federal court on September 4, 
1945, regarding an accident that occurred on October 1, 1943—safely 
within the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by the governing 
Kansas law.132  Service on the defendant, however, was not perfected 
until December 28, 1945, which was outside the two-year limitations 
period and which triggered the potential conflict between Federal Rule 
and state law.  The Ragan Court concluded, in line with the uniformity 
policy of Erie, as articulated in Guaranty Trust, that, “[i]f recovery could 
not be had in the state court, it should be denied in the federal court.”133  
Emphasizing that the state claim at issue “accrues and comes to an end 
when local law so declares,” the Court concluded that the claim could 
not have “longer life in the federal court than it would have had in the 
state court without adding something to the cause of action.”134   
In so holding, the Court gave short shrift to arguments of the 
plaintiff in Ragan135 and Justice Rutledge, in a dissent that he filed with 
respect to each of the three Erie cases decided on the same day as 
Ragan.136  Each argued that, when Federal Rules were at issue, the Erie 
line of cases did not control.137  Justice Rutledge took the majority to 
task for applying to Federal Rules Guaranty Trust’s “gloss on the Erie 
rule” that had positioned the federal court in diversity as “‘merely 
another court of the state in which it sits,’” and, which, in Justice 
 
 129. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 532-34.  E.g., Whitten, supra note 95, at 9-10. 
 130. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 & n.1. 
 131. Id. at 531 & n.4. 
 132. Id. at 531. 
 133. Id. at 532. 
 134. Id. at 533-34. 
 135. Brief of Petitioner, at *7-24, *35-40, Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 
U.S. 530 (1949) (No. 522), 1949 WL 50616 (arguing that Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 
(1941) and Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946), provided the correct 
analysis for determining the validity of Rules promulgated under the REA and that it would be 
improper to extend the Guaranty Trust analysis to Federal Rules). 
 136. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 558-59 (1949) (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting) (emphasizing that the three cases—Ragan, 337 U.S. 530; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 
337 U.S. 535 (1949), and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)—indicate 
the extent to which the Court is inappropriately submitting control of diversity jurisdiction to the 
states, based on a “gloss” on the language of Erie v. Tompkins, rather than to Congress, which “has 
the power to govern the procedure of the federal courts in diversity”). 
 137. See supra notes 135 and 136. 
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Rutledge’s view, had “seriously impaired Congress’s power” to control 
procedure in diversity litigation.138  He concluded that, although it is 
difficult to distinguish between substance and procedure, the Court must 
do so either mechanically by “reference to whether the state courts’ 
doors are open or closed” or by reconciling the rule of Erie with 
Congress’s conceded authority over procedure in the federal courts.139  
Without acknowledging these arguments, the Ragan Court permitted 
state law to control.   
Although commentators’ reports of the death of Rule 3 turned out 
to be premature,140 it was not until much later—1965—that the Hanna 
Court (1) would reinterpret the Ragan case as one in which “the scope of 
the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and 
therefore, there [was] no Federal Rule which covered the point in 
dispute;”141 and (2) would resurrect the notion—ignored by the Supreme 
Court in Ragan, but not in the federal circuit courts142—that Federal 
Rules and statutes were subject to different standards of validity than 
judge-made law.143  In the interim, the sense that broad application of the 
outcome-determinative principle would override conflicting Federal 
Rules (and even federal statutes), combined with the growing arguments 
that outcome determination, as construed by the Court, elevated the 
states above Congress in matters of federal procedure,144 to reduce the 
importance of an avoidance principle.   
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,145 a case decided on 
the same day as Ragan, the Court used an avoidance canon that seemed 
to straddle the divide between “classical” and “modern” or “serious 
doubts” avoidance.146  In classical avoidance, a court must determine 
that the most natural interpretation of a provision would be invalid 
before turning to a narrowing construction of the language.  In so-called 
 
 138. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 558-59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 559. 
 140. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 30, at 432 (stating that “Rule 3 (commencement of action) was 
struck down by the Supreme Court itself in the Ragan case”). 
 141. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).  
 142. See, e.g., Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963); 
D’Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904, 909-10 (1st Cir. 1958); Sampson v. Channell, 
110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940). 
 143. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463-65, 469-74. 
 144. See, e.g., Cohen, 337 U.S. at 558-59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  See also Gavit, supra note 
30, at 26; Hill, supra note 30, at 427-34, 577-86 (recognizing that Court opinions had endangered 
the Federal Rules and, indeed, federal statutes, but arguing that there is federal power to create 
uniform rules of procedure). 
 145. Cohen, 337 U.S. 541. 
 146. See supra notes 107-09. 
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“serious doubts” avoidance, by contrast, the court will, if possible, avoid 
the most natural construction of a provision in favor of a less plausible 
construction, if the most natural interpretation presents a serious 
question of potential invalidity.   
A majority of the Cohen Court avoided finding a direct conflict 
between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b), which included 
prerequisites for stockholder derivative actions, and a New Jersey statute 
that also imposed preconditions on derivative suits.  The state statute 
required a plaintiff in a derivative action, who had specified minimal 
holdings in a defendant corporation, to pay attorney fees and expenses of 
the defendant if the suit were unsuccessful and also to post security for 
payment of the attorney fees and expenses.147  The Court concluded that, 
because there was no conflict between the prerequisites of Rule 23 and 
those in the New Jersey statute, the provisions of both the Federal Rule 
and state law could apply consistently with the policy of Guaranty 
Trust.148   
The Cohen Court parsed the statute into two categories—the clearly 
substantive and the possibly procedural.  It concluded that the statutory 
requirement that plaintiff-stockholders with minimal corporate holdings 
pay attorney fees and expenses of the defendant corporation if the 
defendant prevailed created a new liability and was clearly 
substantive.149  Respecting the requirement to post security for payment 
of attorney fees and expenses, however, the Court noted that procedural 
rules “do not always exhaust their effect by regulating procedure.”150  
Emphasizing that the security requirement made meaningful the 
substantive liability for fees and costs, the Court concluded that it “[did] 
not think” the state requirement could be disregarded by a federal court 
as “a mere procedural device.”151  The Court then compared the 
procedural prerequisites to suit set forth in Rule 23 and those in the New 
Jersey statute.  Finding no conflict in the provisions of Rule and statute 
and that all could be observed, the Court saw “no reason why the policy 
stated in Guaranty Trust . . . should not apply.”152  Again, pre-Hanna 
 
 147. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 543-44, 555-57. 
 148. Id. at 556-57. 
 149. Id. at 555-56. 
 150. Id. at 555. 
 151. Id. at 556.  It is not clear whether the Court decided the issue of invalidity, as in 
“classical” or “narrow” avoidance, or whether its statement that it “[did] not think” that the statute 
“[could] be disregarded as . . . mere procedur[e]” is in fact, an abdication of a final decision and a 
use of serious doubts avoidance.  Id. 
 152. Id.  As with Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), the Cohen Court’s use of avoidance 
protected the Federal Rule as a formal matter.  Rule 23(b) did not yield to state law, as seemed to be 
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avoidance protected the Federal Rule (but not very much), rather than 
state law. 
The Supreme Court did not otherwise overtly reference an 
avoidance principle in pre-Hanna REA cases.  That is unsurprising.  As 
noted, avoidance, in the pre-Hanna period, meant only that the Federal 
Rules would not be invalidated as a formal matter.  As a pragmatic 
matter, the Rules would be subordinated to state law in cases of seeming 
direct conflict, in which outcome determination, as applied by the courts, 
seemed to command that the federal court must sit as “another court of 
the state”153 and that state law prevail.  The Rules also yielded to state 
law (but were not formally invalidated) in instances in which the Court 
avoided a direct conflict, since, absent a conflict with a controlling 
Federal Rule, the state law would apply or both the Federal Rule and 
state law would control.154  Indeed, some commentators, emphasizing 
the ineffectiveness of Federal Rules in diversity cases as opposed to 
federal question cases, began to suggest that the Court make it official 
and promulgate a Rule specifying that Federal Rules applied in federal 
question cases only.155 
In one final pre-Hanna case, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of 
America,156 the Court used an interpretive canon of avoidance.  The 
Bernhardt Court examined a federal statute (rather than a Federal Rule) 
that was in potential conflict with state law.  Bernhardt, thus, is 
inapposite in the REA context because the Court did not construe a Rule 
narrowly to avoid deciding the substantive-procedural limitation of the 
REA.  (The substantive rights limitation, of course, is not applicable to 
federal statutes.157)  Instead, the Court used “serious doubts” avoidance 
to construe the federal statute at issue narrowly in order to avoid 
deciding a serious question of constitutional law.  State law, in 
 
required in the outcome-determinative period, but both state and federal preconditions for 
stockholder derivative suits applied.  Current Supreme Court opinions, however, sometimes 
reference avoidance in Cohen as support for an avoidance principle that protects important state 
interests and regulatory policies.  E.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1462, 1464 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 
487 U.S. 22, 37-38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 153. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).  See supra note 122. 
 154. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556-57 (observing that, where there was no conflict between the 
Federal Rule and state law, there was no reason why, under the policy of Guaranty Trust, both 
should not apply); Palmer, 318 U.S. at 116-17 (state law controls). 
 155. See, e.g., Merrigan, supra note 30, at 727; Clark, supra note 30, at 183-84. 
 156. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
 157. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).  See also Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 
733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984); accord Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and 
Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 748. 
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Bernhardt, permitted revocation of an agreement to arbitrate at any time 
before an arbitral award; the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), by contrast, 
rendered arbitration agreements covered by the FAA “valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable” and permitted stay of a trial court action pending 
arbitration.158  Bernhardt’s use of a “serious doubts” avoidance canon 
was significant, though not to REA avoidance.  The serious question of 
constitutional law that the Bernhardt Court avoided was whether 
Congress had the power to require arbitration in diversity cases in the 
face of contrary state law.  Avoidance, thus, permitted delay—at least 
until the Byrd decision two years later159—of the inevitable decision 
regarding whether the ultimate power over federal procedure in diversity 
cases lay with Congress or the states.   
The battle lines were clearly drawn, however, and avoidance in 
Bernhardt would only buy time regarding the serious constitutional 
inquiry:  Whether states (under the rationale of Erie and Guaranty Trust) 
or Congress (and, thus, also its delegate, the Supreme Court) under the 
authority of Articles I and III and the Supremacy Clause would prevail 
in event of an unavoidable conflict between state law and federal statute 
or Rule.  In the interim, the Bernhardt decision to avoid the clash of state 
law and federal statute seemed to solidify the strength of state law over 
federal procedure and to indicate that even conflicting federal statutes 
would fall to state law under the outcome-determinative approach.160  In 
fact, Judge Charles Clark reported that commentators, concluding that 
Federal Rules that differed from state law could not prevail in diversity, 
were recommending (1) that the principle for validity of any federal 
procedure (whether based on statute, Rule, or judge-made law) be based 
on whether differences between state and federal procedure would lead 
to “forum shopping”; (2) that the Federal Rules be amended to provide 
that they only applied in federal question cases;161 or (3) that courts 
“merely hope” for a reversal in policy from the Supreme Court in “an 
inevitable reaction from the present low point.”162 
 
 158. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 199-201.  
 159. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 160. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 30, at 431-32, 437. 
 161. See, e.g., Merrigan, supra note 30, at 727 (recommending that the Federal Rules be 
repealed as to diversity cases (but not federal question cases) and that federal court conformity to 
state procedure be reinstituted by Court Rule or by statute); Gavit, supra note 30, at 26 (stating that 
the Federal Rules should be amended to state the Court’s intent or to “state that in all diversity cases 
the Rules are not applicable” or the Court should state “that the Supreme Court which promulgated 
the Federal Rules . . ., having power so to do, decided the matter in controversy”). 
 162. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 30, at 183-84. 
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C. The Avoidance Canon in Post-Hanna Cases 
Section II.C focuses on the Supreme Court’s use of avoidance 
techniques in post-Hanna cases, broadening the exploration beyond use 
of avoidance in Erie cases to include avoidance in apparent clashes of 
congressional statutes and Federal Rules and avoidance in general 
construction of Federal Rules.  Section III.C.1 resumes the narrative of 
the evolution of the Erie doctrine and its impact on an avoidance canon 
in REA cases.  Specifically, Section II.C.1 discusses the Supreme 
Court’s limiting of the outcome-determinative approach in Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Hanna v. Plumer and the 
consequent increase in importance of the scope of a Federal Rule.     
Section II.C.2.a discusses the post-Hanna, Erie cases in which the 
Court complied with the substantive-procedural divide by construing 
Rules narrowly and not to conflict with state law, thus making 
unnecessary a validity analysis under the REA.  The post-Hanna cases 
lack a consistent approach to avoidance—other than that avoidance is 
based on federalism concerns.163  They also underscore that avoidance 
based on federalism interests leads to differing definitions of Federal 
Rules in diversity and federal question cases.  Section II.C.2.b concludes 
the historical retrospective with an examination of the Court’s use of 
avoidance in other REA contexts, noting Congress’s move to reclaim a 
role in federal procedural rulemaking in the 1970s and 1980s, which, in 
turn, reprised the importance of the substantive rights limitation in 
potential conflicts between congressional statutes and Federal Rules and 
in construction of Federal Rules.  In these contexts, the Court has, in 
opting for avoidance, relied much more heavily on the text of the Rule, 
its historical context, and the Advisory Committee Notes than the Court 
has done in its use of avoidance in Erie cases.  The Court also generally 
used “serious doubts” avoidance.    
1. From Byrd to Hanna—the Elevation of the Importance of 
Scope 
Two years after its decision in Bernhardt delaying confrontation 
regarding congressional and state power over procedure in federal 
courts, the Supreme Court decided Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric 
Cooperative, Inc.,164 which began the process of making federal 
procedure relevant again in diversity cases.  Rejecting the notion that 
 
 163. See infra notes 188-222 and accompanying text. 
 164. Byrd, 356 U.S. 525. 
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outcome determination was the only consideration when federal and 
state procedural laws clashed, Byrd introduced a form of interest 
balancing that permitted consideration of “affirmative countervailing” 
federal interests and state interests as well as the likelihood that applying 
federal law would be outcome determinative.165  No longer would 
federal courts sitting in diversity be viewed as “only another court of the 
State,” whose procedure must yield to conflicting state procedure or be 
construed narrowly not to apply.  To the contrary, sometimes, in 
instances of conflict, federal procedural law would control.  In this legal 
landscape, a narrow construction of the scope of the Federal Rule at 
issue could be consequential, and, after Hanna, would be dispositive.  
The Supreme Court’s decision seven years later, in Hanna v. 
Plumer,166 completed the Supreme Court’s “inevitable reaction” to rigid 
application of the outcome-determinative principle for which Judge 
Charles Clark had hoped.167  Hanna limited even further the application 
of Erie’s uniformity policy, as articulated in Guaranty Trust;168 
acknowledged congressional superiority in federal procedural law 
enacted in compliance with Congress’s broad authority over federal 
courts under Articles I and III of the Constitution as supplemented by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause;169 and vastly empowered Federal Rules 
promulgated by the Supreme Court when in conflict with state law.  
After Hanna, Federal Rules that conflicted with state law would be valid 
and would control if they neither violated the Constitution, nor exceeded 
the statutory limitations of the Enabling Act.170  A Federal Rule passed 
constitutional muster if the Rule, “though falling within the uncertain 
area between substance and procedure, [was] rationally capable of 
classification as either.”171  It complied with the substantive rights 
limitation of the Rules Enabling Act if it “‘really regulate[d] 
procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties 
recognized by substantive law, and for justly administering remedy and 
redress for disregard or infraction of them.’”172  As Justice Scalia 
emphasized in his plurality opinion in Shady Grove, under post-Hanna 
 
 165. Id. at 535-50. 
 166. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 167. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 168. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467-68.  See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103 
(1945).   
 169. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72. 
 170. Id. at 463-64, 471. 
 171. Id. at 472.  See also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27-28, 31-32 (1988); 
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 & n.3 (1987). 
 172. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).  
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Rule validity standards, the Supreme Court has rejected every challenge 
asserting that a Federal Rule failed to comply with the substantive rights 
limitation.173  It is not clear, however, if this is a virtue or a vestige of the 
Supreme Court’s willingness to construe Rules narrowly to safeguard 
“important state interests.”174  Indeed, Justice Stevens and a growing 
number of commentators have concluded that the Court must, on 
occasion, be willing to find a conflict between Federal Rule and state 
law; to reach the validity analysis; and, on occasion, to invalidate a 
Rule.175  What is certainly clear is that, after Hanna, the scope of the 
Federal Rule became critical.        
Hanna, in fact, also taught the first lessons of instrumental 
interpretation of the scope of Federal Rules in potential conflict with 
state law (1) by providing only a cursory analysis of the scope issue 
regarding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1), which was at issue in 
Hanna; (2) by referencing, as governed by avoidance principles, prior 
cases in which the Federal Rule had seemed to fall to state law under an 
outcome-determinative analysis; and (3) by suggesting that avoidance 
would be governed by federalism concerns.  In determining the scope of 
Rule 4(d)(1), which was at issue in Hanna, the Court did not use a canon 
of narrow construction or avoidance, but simply stated in a conclusory 
manner that “the clash is unavoidable,”176 and it also concluded that 
Rule 4(d)(1) complied with both the constitutional and Enabling Act 
requirements, noting that Rules adopted through the Enabling Act 
process carried a presumption of validity.177  Rule 4(d)(1) permitted 
 
 173. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442-43 
(2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.).  The Hanna Court 
adopted the “really regulates procedure” standard that the Shady Grove plurality reaffirms.  The 
Court, in Burlington Northern, articulated the standard for Rule validity as follows:  “Rules which 
incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate . . . [the substantive rights limitation of 
the REA] if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of [a uniform and consistent system of 
rules governing federal practice and procedure].”  Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5 (citations 
omitted).  The Burlington Northern Court also emphasized that the approval given to Federal Rules 
by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court, combined with the 
requirement to report Federal Rules to Congress for review provide presumptive validity to Rules 
under both the congressional and REA tests.  Id. at 6 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471). 
 174. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1468 & n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id. at 1451-52, 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see 
also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 59, at 51; Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 743. 
 176. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.  
 177. Id. at 462-63 & n.1, 471-74.  The Hanna Court discussed the standards for a Rule’s 
validity under the Constitution and the substantive rights limitation of the REA, id. at 463-65, 471-
74, and it also prescribed a presumption of Rule validity under the REA, indicating that “[w]hen a 
situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the 
typical, relatively unguided Erie Choice:  the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, 
and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their 
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service of process by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at a 
defendant’s residence with “some person of suitable age and discretion 
then residing therein . . . ,” while the Massachusetts statute at issue 
provided for service to be made “by delivery in hand upon such executor 
or administrator” before the expiration of the statutorily specified one-
year period.178  In determining that Rule 4(d)(1) was valid, however, the 
Court ignored a potential substantive rights issue similar to that in 
Ragan—whether the method of substitute service under Rule 4(d)(1) 
interfered impermissibly with the state’s choice to limit an executor’s 
exposure to liability through the notice provision of the state service 
requirements.179 
Second, in its harmonization of prior decisions in which Federal 
Rules had been in potential conflict with state law, the Hanna Court 
hastened to assure that no Federal Rule had ever been invalidated by the 
outcome-determination principle of the RDA analysis.180  The Court 
instructed, instead, that in each case of apparent Federal Rule-state law 
conflict in which state law had prevailed, the Court had determined that 
the scope of the Federal Rule was not broad enough to cover the issue.181  
In support of the position, the Hanna Court appropriately discussed 
Palmer v. Hoffman,182 in which the Court construed Rule 8(c) narrowly, 
and it avoided Rule nullification in the context of the Court’s additional 
conclusion that burden of proof was substantive.  It also appropriately 
 
prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act 
nor constitutional restrictions.”  Id. at 471 (citations omitted). 
 178. Id. at 461-62. 
 179. Of course, a state’s choice to use procedure to enable a substantive purpose does not mean 
that a conflicting Federal Rule would necessarily impact impermissibly the substantive purpose.  
See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 37, at 324-26 (advocating use of a comparative impairment approach 
only in the context of state litigation reform legislation which is identified as having “significant 
substantive objectives” and noting that, in instances of Federal Rule conflicts with litigation reform 
legislation, the federal courts might “usually, perhaps almost always, permit state litigation reform 
legislation to prevail,” but not advocating that such legislation should always prevail); McCoid, 
supra note 40, at 913-14; Whitten, supra note 95, at 14-15. 
 180. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470. 
 181. Id.  The Hanna Court stated as follows: 
The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule.  It is true that there have 
been cases where this Court has held applicable a state rule in the face of an argument 
that the situation was governed by one of the Federal Rules.  But the holding of each 
case was not that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent 
state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing 
party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in 
dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law. 
Id.  
 182. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).  See also supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text. 
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referenced Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,183 in which the 
Court had narrowly interpreted the scope of the Rule 23(b) (now, Rule 
23.1) and, thus, avoided the state-law’s invalidation of the Federal Rule 
(although the court concluded that both state law and Federal Rule 
provisions would govern under principles of Guaranty Trust).  
The Hanna Court’s additional reference to Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co, as a case decided on avoidance principles,184 
however, seemed, at best, strained and, at worst, disingenuous.  The case 
had previously been widely construed as requiring Rule 3 to yield under 
outcome-determinative principles.185  With the Hanna Court’s new take 
on Ragan as decided under avoidance principles, it was possible to read 
Ragan as a case in which the Court (1) had elided an initial 
determination that the Federal Rule and state law did not conflict; and 
(2) had addressed the dispositive issue of whether federal or state law 
would control absent a Federal Rule on point.  Imposing such a 
construction on competing federal and state provisions that both seemed 
to speak directly to when a case should be deemed “commenced,” 
however, suggested that Hanna had, in fact, overruled Ragan.  
Alternatively, it implied that courts could construe a Federal Rule 
against the plain import of its text to conclude that the scope of the 
Federal Rule was not broad enough to control the point in issue.186  
Despite Hanna’s seemingly mechanical standard that would uniformly 
protect Federal Rules, the Court has chosen the latter option in its post-
 
 183. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).  See also supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.   
 184. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 & n.12 (citing Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41, 47-48 (2d Cir. 
1959)).  The Second Circuit in Iovino, indicated that Federal Rules controlled over state law when 
on point and neither beyond the scope of the Rules Enabling Act, nor outside Congress’s authority 
over procedure under the Constitution.  Iovino, 274 F.2d. at 45-46.  The Iovino court, moreover, also 
construed prior Supreme Court cases as dealing with Rules not on point, including Angel v. 
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse 
Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), and Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).  Id. 
at 47.  Finding only the Ragan case troublesome in its conclusion that, in prior cases, Federal Rules 
had not been in conflict with state law, the Iovino court determined that Rule 3 dealt only with 
commencement of an action and not with tolling of the statute of limitations.  Id. at 47-48.   
 185. See, e.g., Gavit, supra note 30, at 3, 6-8 (explaining the Supreme Court’s decision, but 
indicating that it was incorrect); Hill, supra note 30, at 432; Merrigan, supra note 30, at 718-20; but 
see Iovino, 274 F.2d at 47-48. 
 186. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-71 & n.12.  The Hanna Court referenced the Bernhardt case with 
a “cf” citation.  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466, 470  n.12, 472 n.14.  Bernhardt, in which the Court had 
construed a statute, the Federal Arbitration Act, narrowly to avoid serious constitutional doubts is 
doctrinally inapplicable to construing a Federal Rule narrowly to avoid a conflict abridging, 
enlarging, or modifying substantive rights, and the Court seems to acknowledge the distinction.  The 
Court’s reference can be construed as support for use of avoidance principles to prevent 
contravention of the substantive rights limitation of the REA.  Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 201-02.  
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Hanna avoidance jurisprudence, and has construed Rules narrowly on a 
seemingly ad hoc basis to avoid a conflict with state law.  This has 
produced avoidance results that cannot be replicated in lower courts, has 
permitted Federal Rules to be subordinated to state procedural law, and 
has permitted Federal Rules to take on different meanings in diversity 
and federal question cases.   
2. Avoidance in Post-Hanna Cases 
a. Avoidance in Post-Hanna, Erie Cases 
The Supreme Court’s post-Hanna, Erie cases have generally 
premised avoidance, when it is used, on the federalism goals of avoiding 
interference with important state interests or important state regulatory 
policies,187 but otherwise reveal a continuing search for an appropriate 
avoidance principle.  The cases exhibit little consistency in approach to 
avoidance, in defining when state interests or regulatory policies would 
qualify as important, and little consistent reliance on Rule text, Rule 
history, or Advisory Committee Notes to limit permissible “saving” 
constructions.  This avoidance, based on an unbounded concept of 
important state interests and regulatory policies, has led to differing 
interpretations of Federal Rules in diversity and federal question cases. 
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,188 the Supreme Court revisited the 
issue it addressed in Ragan—whether Rule 3 or state law controls the 
commencement of an action for purposes of tolling the state statute of 
limitations.189  Rule 3 and state law seemed to be in “direct conflict,” 
and the appellate court so stated, although it “felt . . .  ‘constrained’ to 
follow Ragan.”190  The Supreme Court in Walker also construed Federal 
Rule 3 not to conflict with the state statute, relying, in part, on stare 
decisis and the need to reconsider both Hanna and Ragan if it were to 
conclude that Rule 3 and the state statute conflicted.191  The Walker 
Court additionally cautioned against a narrow construction of a Federal 
 
 187. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503-04 (2001); Gasperini v. 
Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 & n.7, 436-37 (1996); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 
446 U.S. 740, 751-52 & nn.12-13 (1980). 
 188. Walker, 446 U.S. 740. 
 189. Id. at 742-43.  As in Ragan, the state statute in Walker provided that an action would be 
deemed commenced when the defendant was served, and Rule 3 provided for commencement when 
the complaint was filed.  Id. at 742-43 & nn.3-4.  Also paralleling Ragan, the plaintiff in Walker, 
filed the complaint within the state’s statute of limitations, but did not perfect service within that 
time period.  Id. 
 190. Id. at 744. 
 191. Id. at 745-49. 
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Rule to avert a conflict between Federal Rule and state law when 
contrary to a plain textual reading of the Rule at issue.192  Having so 
advised, however, the Court construed Rule 3 narrowly and against a 
plain reading of its text and, perhaps, history193—an impermissible result 
under the analogous canon to construe ambiguous statutes to avoid an 
unconstitutional construction.194  
Construing a Federal Rule against its text and doing so to protect 
state interests, rather than separation of powers interests, creates 
potential for inconsistencies when the same Rule is construed in federal 
question cases.  This potential for inconsistency played out in the 
nondiversity case, West v. Conrail,195 in which the Supreme Court 
construed Rule 3 differently than in Walker, holding that a complaint is 
timely filed if it is filed, in accord with Rule 3, before the applicable 
statute of limitations runs.196  The Court expressly declined to borrow 
the statute of limitations provisions for service of process197 and 
expressly noted that its construction of Rule 3 meant that Rule 3 would 
be construed differently in diversity and federal question cases, a 
methodology that commentators have disparaged as effectively giving 
“two plain meanings” to Rule 3.198  More fundamentally, Court reliance 
on state interests to guide avoidance when state law is in potential 
conflict with Federal Rules but on “substantive rights” when federal law 
is in potential conflict with Federal Rules, creates two standards for Rule 
validity under the REA.  When combined with a willingness to construe 
 
 192. Id. at 749-50 & n.9. 
 193. Id. at 750-51 & n.10.  Given the Advisory Committee Note’s discussion of the potential 
Rule-validity issue in instances in which Rule 3 clashed with law (federal or state) that tolled the 
statute of limitations based on service, it may be that the rulemakers anticipated a conflict that 
would trigger the Rule validity analysis. 
 194. Cf. Barrett, supra note 57, at 111, 165-67 (emphasizing that substantive canons “can never 
be applied to overcome the plain language of a statute . . . . [but can be used ] to reject the most 
natural interpretation of a statute in favor of a less plausible one that advances a particular value,” 
and noting that such an interpretation respects “the outer limits of statutory language”); Philip P. 
Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy):  The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and 
Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397, 459 (2005) 
(emphasizing that it is “an essential precondition” of use of the avoidance canon that the alternative 
interpretation be plausible); Young, supra note 57, at 1576 (providing that “Congress’s intended 
construction governs  where the intent is clear” and that “[t]he avoidance canon . . . comes up only 
when there is doubt . . . about what the statute means in the first place”). 
 195. 481 U.S. 35 (1987). 
 196. Id. at 39. 
 197. Id.  
 198. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 743-44; Gavit, supra note 30, at 3; Struve, 
supra note 59, at 1150-51. 
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Rules contrary to their text and history, moreover, the door is open again 
to “Erie unlimited.”199 
In its next REA case, the Court did not rely on avoidance, but 
construed the Federal Rule broadly to cover the point in dispute.  In 
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods,200 the Court considered an 
apparent conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 and an 
Alabama statute that imposed a mandatory ten percent affirmance 
penalty when a money judgment was affirmed on appeal without 
substantial modification.201  Rule 38, by contrast, provided that “[i]f the 
court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award 
just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.”202  The 
Burlington Northern Court noted the purposes of Alabama’s mandatory 
affirmance penalty were to penalize frivolous appeals and to provide 
additional damages for having to undergo appeal,203  and the purpose of 
Rule 38 was to permit “damages . . . by the court in its discretion in the 
case of a frivolous appeal as a matter of justice to the appellee and as a 
penalty against the appellant.”204  The Court, first, provided a broader 
definition of the scope of a Federal Rule, indicating that a Federal Rule 
conflicts with state law if it is “‘sufficiently broad’ to cause a ‘direct 
collision’ with the state law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue’ before 
the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of [state] law.”205  
Under this standard, the Court concluded that the discretion permitted by 
Rule 38 conflicted unmistakably with the mandatory nature of the state 
statute, and the purposes of the federal and state provisions were 
“sufficiently coextensive” to establish that the Federal Rule “occupie[d] 
the [state] statute’s field of operation so as to preclude its application.”206  
 
 199. Gavit, supra note 30, at 1. 
 200. 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 201. The Alabama statute provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
When a judgment or decree is entered or rendered for money, whether debt or damages, 
and the same has been stayed on appeal by the execution of bond, with surety, if the 
appellate court affirms the judgment of the court below, it must also enter judgment 
against all or any of the obligors on the bond for the amount of the affirmed judgment, 
10 percent damages thereon and the costs of the appellate court. . . .  
Id. at 480 U.S. at 3.   
 202. Id. at 4. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. (citing Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. R. App. Proc. 38, 28 U.S.C. App. p. 492). 
 205. Id. at 4-5 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 & n.9 (1980); Hanna 
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965)). 
 206. Id. at 7.  Compare Whitten, supra note 95, at 21-25 & nn.117-120 (concluding that the 
Court should have found no conflict between Rule 38 and the Alabama statute because (1) Rule 38 
dealt only with frivolous appeals and the Alabama statute dealt as well with nonfrivolous, but 
nonmeritorious appeals, such as the appeal in Burlington Northern; (2) if the Court had concluded 
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The Burlington Northern Court reached out to find a conflict where none 
was necessary since Rule 38 is, by its terms, limited to penalizing 
frivolous appeals and the Alabama statute at issue encompassed 
nonmeritorious as well as frivolous appeals.  It also did so in the face of 
a substantive purpose of state law to augment available damages when a 
holder of a money judgment survived appeal with the judgment 
substantially intact.  The case seemed to indicate that the Supreme Court 
was abandoning both avoidance as a principle of Rule interpretation and 
its prior protection of state interests. 
Any such intent was short-lived, as the Court, in Gasperini, 
changed course yet again and endorsed a broad avoidance principle – an 
“accommodation” approach, in which the Court balanced and attempted 
to accommodate the interests underlying the potentially conflicting 
federal and state standards.207  The Gasperini Court eschewed the Hanna 
methodology of beginning with an inquiry into the scope of the 
potentially conflicting Federal Rule.  It, instead, concluded that the New 
York statute at issue, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) § 
5501(c),208 was both substantive and procedural,209 and it emphasized 
that the “dispositive question . . . [was] whether federal courts can give 
effect to the substantive thrust of [CPLR] § 5501(c) without untoward 
alteration of the federal scheme for the trial and decision of civil 
cases.”210  In pursuit of the goal of interest accommodation, the 
 
that Rule 38’s regulation of frivolous appeals impliedly negated ability to impose penalties for 
nonmeritorious appeals, it should have so stated and it should have distinguished Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556 (1949); and (3) if other Federal Rules and 
statutes combined with Rule 38 to occupy the field of penalties for frivolous and nonfrivolous 
appeals, the Court should likewise have so stated), with Burbank & Wolff, supra note 59, at 38-39 
(suggesting that the Burlington Northern Court may have been proposing a type of “field 
preemption” regarding federal provision of financial incentives that provide “losing federal court 
litigants’ incentives to appeal,” based on the existence of  multiple federal statutes and Federal 
Rules regarding prejudgment and postjudgment interest and regarding imposition of costs and 
damages for improvident appeals). 
 207. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 419, 436-38 & n.22 (1996).   
 208. New York CPLR § 5501(c) based appellate review of an itemized verdict on a standard of 
whether the verdict “deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation” —a less 
deferential review standard than would have been imposed in federal court under standards 
encompassed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).  N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5501 (MCKINNEY 1997).  Rule 59(a) 
provided that “[a] new trial may be granted . . . for any of the reasons for which new trials have 
heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.”  Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 
467-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (emphasis that was added in the 
Gasperini case has been omitted here)). 
 209. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 429. 
 210. Id. at 426.  See also id. at 437 (noting that “the principal state and federal interests can be 
accommodated” and that “New York’s dominant interest can be respected, without disrupting the 
federal system, once it is recognized that the district court is capable of performing the checking 
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Gasperini Court weighed the substantive and, thus, “dominant” state 
interest and federal interests and determined that both interests could be 
served by providing trial court review, rather than appellate review of 
the verdict.211  The standard Hanna scope analysis was relegated to a 
footnote, was addressed much later in the opinion, and consisted 
primarily of statements that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) was 
inapplicable and that the Court interprets Federal Rules to avoid conflict 
with important state regulatory policies.212  Gasperini’s avoidance by 
accommodation hinged much less on adopting a plausible, though 
narrowed, construction of the text of Rule 59(a) than on the goal of 
limiting application of Rule 59(a), if important state and federal interests 
could both be served by finding a way to accommodate federal and state 
interests.   
Finally, in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,213 a 
unanimous Supreme Court likewise employed a broad avoidance 
principle, but this time one that paralleled the modern statutory canon to 
avoid serious constitutional doubts.  It based avoidance on, among other 
factors, both separation of powers and federalism concerns.  The Semtek 
Court construed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) narrowly (but 
against its accepted meaning) to avoid conflict with California 
preclusion law that would have permitted a case to proceed.214  Rule 
41(b) provided that certain dismissals would operate as an “adjudication 
upon the merits,”215 and it, thus, seemed to define judgments that would 
be eligible for claim preclusive effect.  To avoid an interpretation of 
Rule 41(b) that conflicted with California’s more lenient law and that 
was, thus, arguably in violation of both the substantive rights limitation 
of the REA and “the federalism principle of Erie,” the Court contorted 
 
function, i.e., that the court can apply the State’s ‘deviates materially’ standard in line with New 
York case law . . . .”). 
 211. Id. at 438-39. 
 212. Id. at 437 & n.22.  This avoidance by accommodation foreshadows Justice Ginsburg’s 
similar avoidance strategy in Shady Grove, in which she inquires, first, not about the scope of the 
Federal Rule, but whether a conflict is really necessary.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1460-61 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  More specifically, 
Justice Ginsburg counsels avoidance when “immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules . . . 
would trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest.”  Id. at 1461.   
 213. 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
 214. The issue in Semtek was “whether the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment 
dismissing a diversity action on statute-of-limitations grounds is determined by the law of the State 
in which the federal court sits.”  Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499.   
 215. Id. at 501 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)).  Rule 41(b) provided, in part, as follows:  “any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper 
venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.”  Id. 
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the meaning of “adjudication upon the merits,” determining that it meant 
only that a litigant could not refile the suit in the same district court.216  
Commentators have referred to this limiting construction as 
“transparently dubious,”217 “remarkably strained,”218 and “wildly 
implausible.”219  The Semtek Court, thus, returned to a “serious doubts” 
avoidance analysis and appropriately based avoidance on the Rule’s 
potential violation of substantive rights, but it also considered federalism 
interests.  The saving construction adopted by the Semtek Court, 
moreover, was contrary to the unambiguous meaning of the text, the 
Rule’s history as revealed in Advisory Committee Notes and other 
Advisory Committee information, and prior construction of Rule 
41(b),220 an impermissible result under “serious doubts” avoidance 
principles.221     
In summary, avoidance in the post-Hanna, Erie cases has emerged 
as a malleable surrogate for meaningful guidance regarding the 
substantive rights limitation.  The avoidance cases demonstrate little 
consistency, save for a consistent focus on avoidance to protect state 
interests, which has permitted differing interpretations of Federal Rules 
in diversity and federal question cases.  This focus has permitted too 
much emphasis on unbounded “state interests” and too little on whether 
the Federal Rule impermissibly impacts substantive rights.  The Court 
has also repeatedly changed its methodology for avoidance, thus 
demonstrating continuing dissatisfaction with its avoidance analysis and 
also contrasting with the Court’s fairly consistent use of a serious doubts 
analysis, bounded by Rule text and history, in its admittedly few non-
Erie, REA cases.   
 
 216. Id. at 503-06. 
 217. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 45, at 1042-46 (referring to the Court’s construction of 
Rule 41(b) as “a transparently dubious interpretation” and concluding that the Rule’s history affords 
“no suggestion . . . that the rulemakers intended to cabin the effects [of Rule 41(b)] to the rendering 
court”). 
 218. Patrick Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class Suits 
Certified Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 799, 815-16 
(2004) (emphasizing that the interpretation was “contrary . . . to the text of the Rule” and “had no 
support in the legislative history of the Rule”). 
 219. Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping:  A Dissent from Shady Grove, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 34 (2010). 
 220. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 45, at 1039-47; Struve, supra note 59, at 1150. 
 221. See supra note 195. 
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b. Avoidance in Other REA Contexts 
While the Court has struggled with the scope of Federal Rules in 
Federal Rule-state law conflicts, the Court has also examined the issue 
of Rule scope in other contexts, including congressional statute-Federal 
Rule conflicts and in general Rule interpretation.222  Though the Court 
has taken fewer opportunities to address avoidance in non-Erie, REA 
cases,223 it has used a serious doubts model of avoidance and relied more 
heavily on text and history of the Rule, as described in Advisory 
Committee materials, as a limit on plausible Rule interpretation.   
In resolving apparent congressional statute-Federal Rule conflicts, 
courts have sometimes treated Federal Rules as though they were 
statutes and as though the Court’s prospective rulemaking authority were 
equivalent to Congress’s lawmaking authority.224  This is contrary to the 
Court’s attitude in Erie REA cases in which the Court has often 
subordinated Federal Rules to state law.  The attitude may be attributed, 
in part, to the period of nearly forty years following the enactment of the 
REA, in which Congress generally declined to enact legislation that 
included procedural provisions or to enact amendments to the Federal 
Rules.225  Ultimately, following the 1973 skirmish over promulgation of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence,226 Congress became concerned that the 
proposed evidence rules overstepped the substantive rights limitation.  
Congress, thus, became more active in the rulemaking process and more 
vigilant regarding potential rulemaking infractions of the substantive 
rights limitation.  This meant that the substantive rights limitation would 
not be construed solely in Erie cases featuring Federal Rules and state 
law.  The Supreme Court would now ignore the substantive rights 
limitation in statute-Rule cases to the detriment of its rulemaking 
 
 222. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845-48 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-22 (1997); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991); 
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 542-44 & n.2 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment); but see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (failing to consider directly potential 
substantive rights issue). 
 223. Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 
705-06, 721-26, 750-51 (discussing tendency of federal courts to use an analogy to the statutory 
canon of implied repeal in conflicts between congressional statutes and Federal Rules, which 
obscures issues of rulemaking authority under the REA). 
 224. Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 
704-05; see also supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text. 
 226. E.g., Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 20, at 902-03; Genetin, Conflicts 
Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 694-96; Peter G. McCabe, 
Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1660-62 (1995); Moore, 
supra note 10, at 1054-61. 
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authority.  In fact, some commentators believe the Court’s disregard of 
the potential substantive rights infraction in Marek v. Chesny,227 in part, 
triggered Congress’s unsuccessful attempt to subordinate Court 
rulemaking to congressional statutes by repealing a portion of the 
REA.228   
The Court’s 1984 decision in Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox,229 
appears to be the first congressional statute-Federal Rule case in which a 
justice counseled narrow construction of a Federal Rule to avoid 
potential violation of the substantive rights proviso (although the Court 
had been using an avoidance canon intermittently in Erie cases since 
1943).230  In Daily Income Fund, the Court considered whether Rule 
23.1 imposed a demand requirement before a shareholder could initiate a 
derivative action against a mutual fund under § 36(b) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (ICA).  The majority in Daily Income Fund did 
not reach the REA issue.231   
In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Stevens used a serious 
doubts analysis to read Rule 23.1 narrowly and not to impose a demand 
requirement in any scenario, in order to avoid the conclusion that Rule 
23.1 impacted substantive rights in violation of the REA.232  Justice 
Stevens conceded that a shareholder demand requirement in a derivative 
suit enhances the role of managerial prerogatives and expertise, is 
designed to improve corporate governance, and is substantive.233  He 
emphasized, however, that “the history of Rule 23.1 and its predecessors 
. . . demonstrates” that the demand requirement was created by federal 
common law in Hawes v. City of Oakland,234 and not in Rule 23.1.235  
Moreover, Rule 23.1, by its plain text, did not impose a demand 
requirement, but imposed only a pleading requirement—that the 
complaint allege with particularity the demand, if any, that the 
complainant had made on the corporation.236  The Rule, thus, enabled a 
 
 227. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).    
 228. See infra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 229. 464 U.S. 523 (1984). 
 230. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
 231. Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 533-42.  The majority concluded that a § 36(b) action was 
not a “derivative action” because § 36(b) could not be enforced by a mutual fund.  Id. 
 232. Id. at 542-44 & n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
 233. Id. at 544 n.2 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) and Ely, supra 
note 15)). 
 234. Id. at 543-44 & n.2. 
 235. Id. at 543 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
 236. Id.  Rule 23.1 provided at the time, in pertinent part, as follows:   
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff 
to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if 
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court to ascertain from the pleadings whether an otherwise applicable 
demand requirement had been satisfied.237  In language similar to the 
canon to construe against serious constitutional doubts, Justice Stevens 
determined that there is a “substantial doubt whether [Rule 23.1] could 
create . . . [a demand] requirement consistently with the Rules Enabling 
Act,”238 and, thus, “[s]ince the rule does not clearly create such a 
substantive requirement by its express terms, it should not be lightly 
construed to do so and thereby alter substantive rights.”239  In so 
concluding, Justice Stevens relied on the text and history of Rule 23.1.  
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of whether Rule 23.1 should be 
construed narrowly and not to impose a demand requirement in the 1991 
case of Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.240  Concluding that a 
demand requirement is substantive, it adopted the narrow construction of 
Rule 23.1 suggested by Justice Stevens in Daily Income Fund.241 
The year after the Court decided Daily Income Fund, however, a 
majority of the Court, in Marek v. Chesny,242 declined even to address 
the issue of whether the construction of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
68 that it adopted would violate the substantive rights limitation.  At 
issue was whether a prevailing plaintiff’s right to attorney fees under the 
Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act, in which attorneys fees are defined to be 
part of “costs,”243 would be subject to shifting of “costs” under Rule 
68,244 and, further, according to Justice Brennan in dissent, whether such 
 
necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the 
action or for not making the effort. 
Id. at 543 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
 237. Id. at 543. 
 238. Id. at 544 n.2 (citing Miss. Publ’g Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946); Sibbach v. 
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)). 
 239. Id. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1965)). 
 240. 500 U.S. 90 (1991).   
 241. Id. at 96-97 (citing Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 543-44 & n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in judgment); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-57 (1949); Hanna, 380 
U.S. at 477).   
 242. 473 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 243. 42 U.S.C. § 1988b provided as follows: 
In any action or proceeding to enforce [relevant sections of this and other titles], the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, except that in any action brought against a 
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity such 
officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney’s fees, unless such action 
was clearly in excess of such officer’s jurisdiction. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
 244. Rule 68 provided, in part, as follows: 
(a) At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending a claim may serve on 
an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then 
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a construction of Rule 68 would violate the substantive rights limitation 
of the REA.  Disregarding the issue of impermissible impact on 
substantive rights, the Marek majority used a “plain meaning” 
construction of the intersection of Rule 68 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to 
conclude that the two provisions could be harmonized:  Rule 68 
provided for shifting of “costs” incurred after a plaintiff failed to accept 
a Rule 68 offer of judgment and later received less than the offer at trial, 
and § 1988 defined “costs” for purposes of the Civil Rights Attorney Fee 
Act to include “attorney fees.”245  Hence, the Court held that, absent a 
clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary, attorney fees in 
civil rights actions were “costs” that could be forfeited under Rule 68.246  
Justice Brennan forcefully asserted in dissent that the majority’s 
interpretation of Rule 68 violated the substantive rights provision of the 
REA because it permitted a little known Federal Rule regarding “cost” 
shifting to override Congress’s policy decision that prevailing plaintiffs 
in § 1983 civil rights actions should normally receive attorney fees.247  
Moreover, Judge Posner, who wrote the Seventh Circuit opinion that 
was ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court majority in Marek, 
advised a “serious doubts” type of avoidance, emphasizing that Federal 
Rules “have sometimes been interpreted or their domain of application 
narrowed to avoid abridging substantive rights;” he cited, inter alia, Erie 
REA avoidance cases; and he concluded that the term “costs” in Rule 68 
should have been narrowly construed to avoid an interpretation that 
would abridge the right to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.248   
The Marek decision sparked congressional concern that the Court 
was exceeding its prospective rulemaking authority under the REA and, 
in part, precipitated the House of Representative’s ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt to amend the REA so that conflicting Federal Rules 
 
accrued. 
 . . .  
(d) If the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the 
unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a), (d). 
 245. Marek, 473 U.S. at 9; id. at 15-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord Bone, To Encourage 
Settlement, supra note 20, at 611; Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal 
Rules, supra note 10, at 706-10.  The Marek majority did conclude that its construction of the 
intersection of § 1988 and Rule 68 was not inconsistent with Congress’s objectives in enacting § 
1988.  E.g., Marek, 473 U.S. at 10-11; Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and 
Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 709. 
 246. Marek, 473 U.S. at 9. 
 247. Id. at 28-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 248. Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1984), rev’d 473 U.S. 1 (1985); accord 
Marek, 473 U.S. at 32-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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would not supersede congressional statutes.249  Marek underscores, in 
the congressional statute-Federal Rule context, the real risks of Rule 
interpretation when courts rely on text unaided by the touchstones of 
history and purpose.  Indeed, Professor Bone has characterized Marek v. 
Chesny as “perhaps the most notorious example of the hazards created 
by an oversimplified interpretive approach.”250  He has also concluded 
that the presumption of validity that Hanna extends to Federal Rules251 
should extend only to Rule interpretations that “further the Rule’s actual 
purpose in some sufficiently direct way,” since the presumption is 
premised on the Rule’s having been vetted through the Enabling Act 
process.252 
Finally, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Supreme Court used a 
serious doubts avoidance methodology and relied on Rule text and 
history in adopting a narrowed construction of Rule 23(b)(1)(B).253  In 
Ortiz, the Supreme Court adopted a limiting construction of the “limited 
fund” class action available under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in order to avoid 
violating the REA’s requirement that Rules not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify substantive rights and to stay close to the historical basis for the 
limited fund class.254  The Ortiz Court rejected a proposed broad 
 
 249. E.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience:  Mandatory Informal Discovery and the 
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 850 (1991).  See also generally Burbank, supra note 
10, at 1030-39; Moore, supra note 10, at 1044-48; Note, The Rules Enabling Act and the Limits of 
Rule 23, 111 HARV. L. REV.  2294, 2298-99 (1998).  The attempt to amend the REA to eliminate the 
provision permitting Federal Rules to supersede federal statutes failed because the Senate refused to 
pass similar legislation, in part based on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s pledge to tread carefully in 
promulgating Federal Rules that might violate the substantive rights limitation.  Moore, supra note 
10, at 1051-52. 
 250. Bone, To Encourage Settlement, supra note 20, at 1615. 
 251. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
 252. Bone, To Encourage Settlement, supra note 20, at 1616-17; David Marcus, When Rules 
Are Rules:  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Institutions in Legal Interpretation, ___ 
UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1852856 (concluding that, 
in interpreting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts should “inquire into rulemaker intent or how 
a rule’s authors hoped it would apply, and purpose, or what functions a rule’s authors wanted it to 
serve”). 
 253. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).  See also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).  In 
Amchem, the Supreme Court also referenced avoidance in construing Rule 23.  The Amchem Court 
emphasized the “extensive deliberative process” under the REA and that the process is “properly 
tuned” to Congress’s instruction that Federal Rules “shall not . . . abridge . . . any substantive right.”  
Id. at 620.  Observing that class action practice had become “ever more ‘adventuresome,’” the Court 
reviewed the history of class action practice and concluded that federal courts “lack authority to 
substitute for Rule 23’s certification criteria” the fairness hearing requirements.  Id. at 617, 621-22. 
 254. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842-45.  In Ortiz, attorneys, who proposed a settlement class action on a 
limited fund basis, sought certification of a 23(b)(1)(B) class that did not meet the following 
traditional requirements of a limited fund class:  The totals of the aggregated liquidated claims and 
the fund available for satisfying them, set definitely at their maximums, should demonstrate the 
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mandatory settlement class rationale, concluding that although the text 
of the Rule could accommodate the proposed “adventurous”255 
application of the limited fund class, the Advisory Committee Notes 
showed that Rule 23(b)(1) was drafted in a “consciously retrospective” 
manner with an “intent to codify pre-Rule categories.”256  Further, the 
Court concluded that the substantive rights proviso of the REA also 
encouraged a cautious and narrower construction of the limited fund 
class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), noting that the broader construction 
of the Rule would set up a potential conflict between the pro rata 
distribution of available funds proposed in a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class 
action and the right to complete recovery in personal injury actions 
under state law.257  The Court emphasized that, even if some tension 
between a Federal Rule and state law is permissible, it is best to keep the 
tension within tolerable limits by narrowing the limited fund action 
available under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to practice preceding adoption.258  The 
Court, thus, applied a “serious doubts” avoidance methodology to adopt 
a limiting construction of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), and it limited the Rule’s 
coverage to the “practice preceding its adoption” and “Advisory 
Committee’s expressions of understanding” regarding the scope of 
limited fund class actions.259   
Thus, in its few non-Erie, REA cases, the Court has generally used 
a serious doubts method of avoidance to stay within the substantive 
rights limitation of the REA, and it has calibrated its limiting 
interpretations to plausible interpretations based on the Rule’s text, 
history, and purposes as discussed in relevant Advisory Committee 
Notes, reports, and other information.  In Marek v. Chesny, the Court 
failed to do so, but at the price of heightened congressional concern that 
the Court was overstepping the substantive rights boundary.260  In Shady 
Grove, the justices engage, once again, the important issues of 
 
inadequacy of the fund to pay all the claims, id. at 838-39, “the whole of the inadequate fund 
[should] . . . be devoted to the overwhelming claims,” id. at 839, and the claimants identified by a 
common theory of recovery should be treated equitably among themselves.  The proposed Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) class fell short of these requirements because, inter alia, the dollar amount comprising 
the “limited fund” was set by agreement of the defendants, the claimants did not include all 
potentially interested claimants, and the proposed payout would not deliver the proceeds on a pro 
rata basis.  Id. at 839-41. 
 255. Id. at 845. 
 256. Id. at 842-43. 
 257. Id. at 845. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 842-46. 
 260. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 10, at 1029-36; Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional 
Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 697-98, 709; Moore, supra note 10, at 1043-50. 
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appropriate methodology and guiding principles for avoidance in REA 
cases.  They reference and adopt varying elements of the Court’s 
historical use of avoidance, to propose three different methods for 
avoidance that span a range of providing a very narrow to an extremely 
broad scope for avoidance in REA issues. 
III.  THE SHADY GROVE DEBATE REGARDING AVOIDANCE IN REA CASES 
The fractured opinions in Shady Grove reveal wide-ranging 
differences on the Court regarding both the interpretation of the 
substantive rights proviso of the REA261 and the nature and extent of an 
appropriate avoidance canon of Rule interpretation in REA cases.  
Section II revealed that the Supreme Court has, since its first use of an 
avoidance canon in REA cases in Palmer v. Hoffman,262 vacillated 
regarding whether it would even use an avoidance canon in interpreting 
compliance with the substantive rights limitation of the REA, concluding 
most often that avoidance was appropriate, but at other times that it 
would construe Rules broadly and find a conflict when no conflict 
seemed necessary.263  The Court has also used differing avoidance 
methodologies.  The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in 
Shady Grove exhibit the Court’s continuing ambivalence regarding the 
appropriate model for avoidance, with Justice Scalia, in dicta, presenting 
a type of classical avoidance; Justice Stevens joining that portion of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, but also proposing a version of a serious doubts 
canon of avoidance; and Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, preferring a theory 
of avoidance by accommodation. 
The Shady Grove case involved a potential conflict between 
language in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b), which provides that “a class action 
may be maintained” if the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b) are met, 
and CPLR § 901(b), which forbids maintenance of a class action for a 
statutorily prescribed penalty or minimum payment, unless the 
 
 261. Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality in Shady Grove would adhere to a standard of 
whether a Rule “‘really regulat[e][s] procedure.’”  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and 
Sotomayor, J.).  Justice Stevens, in concurrence in Shady Grove, suggests that the substantive rights 
limitation precludes Federal Rules that “would displace a state law that is procedural in the ordinary 
use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope 
of the state-created right.”  Id. at 1452-53 & nn.8-9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment).    
 262. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
 263. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1987); cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh 
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26, 28-32 (1988) (apparent congressional statute-Federal Rule conflict at issue). 
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authorizing statute expressly permits a class action.264  In the underlying 
case, Shady Grove had provided medical care to a patient and had taken, 
as partial payment, an assignment of insurance benefits issued to the 
patient in New York by Allstate Insurance Co.265  When Shady Grove 
sought payment for the assigned benefits, Allstate paid but failed to do 
so within the thirty-day period in which New York required either 
payment or denial of a claim, and Allstate later refused to pay the 
statutorily required interest.266  Shady Grove thereafter filed a class 
action suit against Allstate in the Eastern District of New York based on 
diversity jurisdiction to recover unpaid interest on its own claim and on 
claims of all others that Allstate had allegedly failed to pay timely.267   
Allstate countered that CPLR § 901(b) prevented the proposed class 
action because it precludes a class action for a penalty or minimum 
recovery unless the statute creating the penalty or minimum statutory 
damages specifically permits a class action suit.268  Allstate also argued 
that, absent the ability to collect other claims for unpaid interest in a 
class action, Shady Grove, which incurred approximately $500 in unpaid 
interest, could not meet the amount in controversy requirement for 
diversity jurisdiction.269  These facts set up the potential conflict 
between  CPLR § 901(b) and Rule 23(b), which provides, in part, that 
“[a] class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if” the 
proposed class action is within one of the categories of permissible class 
actions set forth in Rule 23(b).270  The District Court held that Rule 
23(b) and CPLR § 901(b) did not conflict and that CPLR § 901(b) 
precluded class action treatment of the claim at issue.271  It, therefore, 
dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.272  The 
Second Circuit affirmed.273 
 
 264. N.Y.C.P.L.R.  § 901(b) (MCKINNEY 2005). 
 265. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 (majority opinion). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 1436-37.  
 268. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2005).  Section 901(b) provides as follows: 
Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery 
specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a 
penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be 
maintained as a class action. 
Id. 
 269. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37 (majority opinion). 
 270. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 271. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp.2d 467, 475 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 143-45 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
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In a decision that featured fractured opinions and disparate 
reasoning, the Supreme Court reversed, with five justices concluding 
that Rule 23(b) and CPLR § 901(b) conflicted, that is, Rule 23(b) is 
broad enough to cover the issue in dispute.274  Five justices also 
concluded that Rule 23(b) is valid and, thus, preempts state law, but they 
differed on the rationale for validity.  Justice Scalia wrote a plurality 
opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas 
and Sotomayor, which concluded that Rule 23(b) was valid because the 
standard for validity is whether the Rule “‘really regulat[e][s] procedure 
– the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by 
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for 
disregard or infraction of them,’”275 and the plurality concluded that 
Rule 23(b) satisfied that standard.  Justice Stevens concurred in the 
decision that Rule 23(b) was valid, but he interpreted the substantive 
rights limitation to preclude Federal Rules that “would displace a state 
law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so 
intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the 
scope of the state-created right.”276  Concluding that CPLR § 901(b) was 
procedural and not sufficiently intertwined with substantive purposes, 
Justice Stevens concluded that Rule 23 governed.277  Justice Ginsburg 
dissented.  Writing for four dissenting justices, she determined that Rule 
23(b) did not conflict with § 901(b) and would have applied an Erie 
analysis.278  
In this Section, I examine the divergent methods for analyzing the 
scope of a Federal Rule in potential conflict with state law that are 
presented in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Shady 
 
 274. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1431-42 (majority opinion).  Justice Scalia wrote this portion 
of the opinion—Sections I and II.A—on behalf of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices 
Stevens, Thomas, and Sotomayor.  No other portions of the opinion commanded a majority. 
 275. Id. at 1442 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.) (quoting 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) and also citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 
(1965); Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987)).  A plurality in Shady Grove concluded that 
“[w]hat matters is what the rule itself regulates:  If it governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by 
which the litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the] 
court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not” Id. (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 
438, 445 (1946)).  The plurality concluded that Rule 23(b) met this standard.  Id. at 1443-44.   
 276. Id. at 1452-54 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  For 
Justice Stevens, the substantive rights limitation will preclude an application of a Federal Rule that 
abridges, enlarges, or modifies substantive rights.  That will happen rarely, but if a state procedural 
law is sufficiently intertwined with a state right or remedy, a conflicting Federal Rule may be 
invalidated.  Id.   
 277. Id. at 1456-60. 
 278. Id. at 1460-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent on behalf of 
herself and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. 
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Grove.  I conclude that an avoidance principle is warranted in REA 
cases, and it should be based on analogy to construing statutes narrowly 
to avoid serious constitutional doubts, in a manner similar to the 
avoidance principles proffered by Justice Stevens in Shady Grove.  Such 
an avoidance rule of interpretation, however, should be guided by 
whether a Rule would encroach on Congress’s substantive lawmaking 
choices, rather than on whether a Rule might interfere with an unlimited 
concept of important state interests or regulatory policies.279  Further, in 
determining whether avoidance is permissible, the Court should, in line 
with its use of avoidance in other Enabling Act contexts,280 construe a 
Rule in accord with the Rule’s text and its history and purposes, as set 
forth in the Advisory Committee Notes and other Advisory Committee 
sources.281   
 
 279. Justice Stevens, at times, states broadly that “federal rules cannot displace a State’s 
definition of its own rights or remedies.”  Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment).  Although this is, as a general matter, true, the Court has also recognized that 
“[t]he cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing the development of a uniform and consistent 
system of rules governing federal practice and procedure suggests that Rules which incidentally 
affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain 
the integrity of that system of rules.”  Burlington, 480 U.S. at 5-6(citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464-65; 
Murphree, 326 U.S. at 445-46; 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4509, at 145-46 (1982)).   
 280. See supra notes 225-61 and accompanying text. 
 281. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“When a federal rule appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right, the 
federal courts must consider whether the rule can reasonably be interpreted to avoid that 
impermissible result. . . . And when such a ‘saving’ construction is not possible and the rule would 
violate the Enabling Act, federal courts cannot apply the rule”).  See also Bone, To Encourage 
Settlement, supra note 20, at 1615-17 (concluding that the text and purpose of Rule 68 better 
explain the Rule than the Court’s plain language approach in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) 
and that, when construing Federal Rules in light of the substantive rights limitation, interpretations 
of Rules should be accorded Hanna’s presumption of validity only if they “further the Rule’s actual 
purpose in some sufficiently direct way”); Marcus, supra note 253, at 5, 37, 48-51 (recognizing 
importance of the Advisory Committee Notes and other documents created in the rulemaking 
process and concluding that, in interpreting Federal Rules, courts should act as faithful agents of the 
rulemakers, absent extraordinary circumstances); Nathan R. Sellers, Defending the Formal Federal 
Civil Rulemaking Process:  Why the Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules Through Judicial 
Interpretation, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 328-39 (2011) (concluding that the Court should amend 
Rules only through the formal Enabling Act process because of the opportunity for input from 
diverse constituencies, the greater ability to make systemic changes through the rulemaking process, 
the ability to clarify amendments, and the opportunity for review by Congress); Struve, supra note 
59, at 1124-42, 1147 (suggesting that the nature of and reality of the Enabling Act process counsel 
restraint in Court construction of Federal Rules and that the Court should “give[] authoritative 
weight to the Advisory Committee Notes”).  See also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 59, at 48-49 
(advocating that unless a Federal Rule “actually makes a policy choice that Congress has had an 
opportunity to review [following its prescribed Enabling Act process],” the Court should be able to 
use its federal common lawmaking authority in Rule interpretation). 
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A. Avoidance by Analogy to the Canon to Construe Statutes Against 
Serious Constitutional Doubts 
1. Justice Scalia, in Dicta, Endorses a Type of Classical 
Avoidance  
In the portion of his opinion that attracted five justices,282 Justice 
Scalia reiterated the two-part framework for resolving REA issues that 
has been standard since Hanna v. Plumer283 and also discussed in dicta 
an avoidance canon for Federal Rule-state law conflicts.  The REA 
framework, he noted, entails a twofold inquiry.  First, one must ask 
whether the disputed point falls within the scope of the Federal Rule,284 
or as Justice Scalia stated in Shady Grove, in perhaps a broader 
formulation of the scope inquiry, whether the Rule and arguably 
conflicting state law “answer[] the same question.”285  If the answer to 
that question is affirmative, then, in contrast to the “relatively unguided 
Erie choice” under the RDA, one must inquire whether the Rule is 
within Congress’s constitutional rulemaking authority and within the 
limits of rulemaking authority delegated to the Supreme Court in the 
REA.286   
With respect to the initial inquiry regarding whether a Federal Rule 
and state law conflict, Justice Scalia, in dicta, endorsed a type of 
classical avoidance canon—avoidance that is triggered if a Rule is 
susceptible of two meanings, one that would violate the substantive 
rights proviso and one that would not.287  This recharacterizes slightly, 
but significantly, the avoidance analysis Justice Scalia has used in 
previous opinions.288  Of equal importance, Justice Scalia’s analysis of 
the scope of Rule 23(b) in Shady Grove differs from his avoidance 
analysis in prior opinions in that he no longer appears willing to find the 
Federal Rule ambiguous or susceptible of two meanings and thus to 
permit a limiting construction.289   
 
 282. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Thomas, and 
Sotomayor in Sections I and II.A. of his opinion. 
 283. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 460, 463-65, 469-71. 
 284. Id. at 470-72. 
 285. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (majority opinion). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 1441-42 & nn.7-8. 
 288. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-04 (2001).  See 
also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 289. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437, 1442 (majority opinion) (finding that “[b]y its terms, 
[Rule 23(b)] creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to 
pursue his claim as a class action” and, moreover, that “Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes any 
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Justice Scalia has long recognized avoidance as a legitimate 
principle of statutory or Rule interpretation in Erie cases,290 but his prior 
opinions turned at least in part on avoidance to prevent substantial 
disuniformity of outcome in state and federal courts, i.e., on federalism 
interests.291  Thus, his formulation of avoidance was perhaps in need of 
recalibration, but not of the significant dismantling it seems to undergo 
in Shady Grove.   
In his dissenting opinion in the 1987 case Stewart Organization, 
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,292 Justice Scalia outlined an avoidance canon for 
congressional statutes in potential conflict with state law that is 
substantially similar to “classical” avoidance.  Classical avoidance 
counsels construing a statute narrowly, if a narrowing construction is 
possible, and if the statute’s most natural construction would be 
invalid.293  He based avoidance on federalism interests,294 however, 
rather than on the separation of powers principles that underlie the 
substantive rights limitation of the REA.  This is unsurprising since 
Stewart involved a federal statute in potential conflict with state law, 
rather than a Federal Rule-state law conflict.  Federal statutes, of course, 
are not subject to the REA proviso prohibiting abridging, enlarging, or 
modifying substantive rights.295  Where Justice Scalia was perhaps 
analytically imprecise in Stewart was that, after formulating an 
 
plaintiff, in any federal civil proceeding, to maintain a class action if the Rule’s prerequisites are 
met” (emphasis in original)).  See Young, supra note 57, at 1577 (indicating that “the importance of 
any given canon or rule of construction will be, to a considerable extent, a function of the 
willingness of courts to find that statutes are ‘unclear’”). 
 290. Justice Scalia used avoidance principles in his dissenting opinion in Stewart, 487 U.S. at 
37-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) and in his opinion for a unanimous Court in Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-
04. 
 291. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04 (adopting a limiting construction of Rule 41(b) because a 
broader construction “would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling 
Act” and because, if broadly interpreted, the Rule would “in many cases violate the federalism 
principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins”); Stewart, 487 U.S. at 37-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(contending that the statute should be read narrowly to avoid “significant disuniformity between 
state and federal courts”). 
 292. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 37-38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 293. Id.  There is, in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, no indication that he would limit 
avoidance to the narrow or classical form.  Justice Scalia simply indicated that the conditions for 
classical avoidance had been met. 
 294. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating a limiting interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) in 
order to “avoid the significant encouragement to forum shopping that will inevitably be provided by 
the interpretation the Court adopts”). 
 295. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965); See, e.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 
733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that rules enacted by Congress are not subject to the 
substantive rights limitation of the REA); see also Genetin, Conflicts Between Congressional 
Statutes and Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 748. 
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avoidance canon regarding the federal statute at issue, he included 
Federal Rules, in dicta, as subject to the same avoidance principle.   
In Stewart, the majority held that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),296 regarding 
transfer of suits among federal district courts, controlled the effect to be 
given to the parties’ contractual choice of forum agreement.297  In 
dissent, Justice Scalia would have found § 1404(a), at best, 
ambiguous,298 and, thus, would have construed § 1404(a) narrowly.  
Justice Scalia urged that “[i]n deciding whether a federal procedural 
statute or Rule of Procedure encompasses a particular issue, a broad 
reading that would create significant disuniformity between state and 
federal courts should be avoided if the text permits.”299  He explained 
that, since Erie, when a Federal Rule or statute is not on point (that is, in 
making an “unguided Erie choice” under the RDA analysis), courts have 
strived for substantially uniform outcomes in cases that are in federal 
court based on diversity jurisdiction.300  That statement is unremarkable, 
at least with respect to Federal Rules.  Justice Scalia concluded also that 
the impulse toward substantially uniform outcomes in federal and state 
courts derives from the constitutional and congressional plan for 
diversity jurisdiction.301  In language quoted in all three Shady Grove 
opinions,302 Justice Scalia advised that the Court “should assume . . . 
when it is fair to do so, that Congress is just as concerned as we have 
been to avoid significant differences between state and federal courts in 
adjudicating claims.”303  This may generally be an appropriate 
presumption with respect to congressional statutes,304 a subject that is 
 
 296. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provided as follows: 
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court 
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been 
brought. 
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
 297. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29-31 (concluding that the flexible standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 
1404(a) included consideration of the parties’ private expression of preference regarding venue). 
 298. Id. at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 299. Id.  Justice Scalia’s articulation of avoidance also required that the limiting construction 
be a plausible interpretation of the text.               
 300. Id. at 37. 
 301. Id. at 39. 
 302. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1441 & n.7 
(2010) (majority opinion); id. at 1451 & n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 303. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 304. See, e.g., Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451, 1453 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 
(2009) for the proposition that a federal statute will not displace state law “unless that was the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress”). 
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beyond the scope of this Article.  Justice Scalia’s inclusion, in dicta, of 
Federal Rules in his avoidance approach, however, was incomplete, 
since the substantive rights limitation of the REA provides the measure 
of Federal Rules.   
Justice Scalia next addressed avoidance in Semtek International 
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.305  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
Scalia used a type of serious doubts avoidance to construe Rule 41(b) 
narrowly and, many have suggested, contrary to any plausible textual or 
historical construction of the Rule.  Justice Scalia based avoidance both 
on avoiding arguable violation of the substantive rights limitation of the 
REA,306 and on avoiding “violating the federalism principle of Erie.”307  
Federalism interests still played a role, and perhaps a substantial role, in 
Justice Scalia’s view of avoidance, although Justice Scalia started to 
realign avoidance to include separation of powers concerns.  Of course, 
as indicated earlier, the Semtek case represented an instance in which no 
avoidance canon, regardless of underlying premise, should have been 
available under a serious doubts analysis because the Rule was not 
capable of the narrowing construction adopted, consistent with text and 
history.308  Thus, the Court should have reached the issue of Rule 
validity. 
In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia restated and narrowed any available 
avoidance principle, and he rejected “important state interests” and 
“state regulatory policies” as the guiding principle for avoidance.  After 
determining that the Rule and state law were in conflict, Justice Scalia 
articulated an avoidance principle, in dicta, in Shady Grove, as follows:  
“If the Rule [is] susceptible of two meanings—one that would violate § 
2072(b) and another that would not” —then the Rule at issue should be 
construed narrowly.309  In this restated avoidance principle, Justice 
Scalia corrected his prior use of avoidance in REA cases,310 which had 
focused in whole or in part on avoiding disuniformity of outcomes in 
federal and state courts.311   
Justice Scalia’s new formulation, however, limits the availability of 
an avoidance canon of Rule interpretation in several significant ways.  
 
 305. 531 U.S. 497, 501-05 (2001). 
 306. Id. at 503-04 (citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842 (1999)). 
 307. Id. at 504. 
 308. See supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text. 
 309. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441-42 (majority opinion) (citing Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842, and 
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04). 
 310. Id. at 1441-42 & n.7 (rejecting the suggested narrowing of Rule 23(b) based on “important 
state interests” and “state regulatory policies” as “standardless”). 
 311. See supra notes 291-310 and accompanying text. 
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First, he reverted to “classical” or “narrow” avoidance, no longer 
espousing avoidance based on serious doubts regarding Rule validity, 
but indicating, instead, that he would choose a limiting construction of 
an ambiguous Rule only if the Rule were susceptible of two 
constructions, one of which would violate the substantive rights 
limitation and the other of which would not.  Second, Justice Scalia no 
longer construes Rules in terms of “limiting” or “reasonable” 
constructions312 or “broad”313 and “narrow” construction, but in terms of 
“artificial narrowing.”314  Thus, Justice Scalia is not willing to find 
ambiguity in Rule 23(b), but construes the Rule, instead, in categorical 
terms based on its text, thus reminding that interpretive philosophy will 
directly impact the availability of avoidance.  Third, the combination of 
Justice Scalia’s narrow definition of avoidance with his proposed broad 
standard for Rule validity means that avoidance will not be available in 
practice:  A “classical” or narrow requirement that a Rule must be found 
to violate the substantive rights limitation to permit avoidance, combined 
with a “really regulates procedure” standard that admits of little if any 
possibility of Rule invalidity means that avoidance will be available in 
principle only.  Justice Scalia seems, thus, to present a version of Hanna 
reinvigorated, which includes the Rule-protective features of Hanna but 
eliminates the escape hatch of avoidance through narrow Rule 
interpretation.  Such an approach presents the very real possibility of 
underprotecting the separation of powers boundary that Congress 
included in the REA and, correspondingly, underprotecting state 
substantive rights.  Of course, Justice Scalia discussed avoidance only in 
dicta, and there certainly is a danger of reading too much into his brief 
discussion.   
Tellingly, however, Justice Scalia turned to discussion of avoidance 
principles in Shady Grove only after he had dispelled any notion that 
Rule 23(b) could be ambiguous and that avoidance might play a role in 
interpreting the Rule.  Before considering avoidance principles, Justice 
Scalia concluded that, Rule 23(b), by its terms, provided that a class 
action “may be maintained” if the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b) 
are met.315  Rule 23(b), Justice Scalia concluded, provides a categorical, 
one-size-fits-all formula for determining when a class action may be 
maintained.316  Absent a conclusion that the language of the Rule is 
 
 312. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503, 505. 
 313. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 314. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 (majority opinion). 
 315. Id. at 1437.  
 316. Id. at 1437, 1440. 
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ambiguous or capable of more than one interpretation, no avoidance 
principle can apply.317  Further, the “‘really regulat[e][s] procedure’” 
standard Justice Scalia recognizes for Rule validity is extremely Rule 
protective.318  What matters is the Federal Rule itself and what it 
regulates, not whether the Rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights:  “If 
[a Rule] governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ 
rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision by 
which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.”319  Under this 
standard, Justice Scalia concluded that Rule 23(b) is simply a claims 
joinder rule that mandates joinder at plaintiff’s option when the 
enumerated conditions of 23(a) and (b) are met.320 
In summary, Justice Scalia backed away from a strong version of 
an avoidance canon, and he argued for a standard of Rule validity under 
which Federal Rules would rarely, if ever, be found to violate the 
substantive rights limitation.  Both conclusions protect Congress’s goal 
of delegating authority to the Supreme Court to create uniform, 
predictable, and simple procedural rules for the federal courts and 
protect the integrity of the Federal Rules, but, in tandem, they seem also 
to permit disservice of Congress’s additional goal that Federal Rules not 
encroach on Congress’s substantive policy choices.    
Moreover, the Court’s previous decisions in Semtek, Gasperini, and 
Walker reveal its hesitance in permitting Federal Rules regularly to 
preempt potentially substantive state law.  This reluctance suggests that, 
if a standard for Rule validity does not provide for meaningful 
consideration of substantive rights, the Court will continue to seek 
means of avoiding the issue of Rule validity, including continued ad hoc 
construction of Rules to accommodate state interests, adoption of a 
modern or serious doubts canon of avoidance, promulgation of Rules 
that more nearly include only “case processing” or “housekeeping” 
standards,321 and perhaps acceptance of increased suggestions for 
congressional cooperation or participation in Rule promulgation.322   
 
 317. See supra note 195. 
 318. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and 
Sotomayor, J.) (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 
460, 464 (1965); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987)). 
 319. Id. at 1442, 1444 (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 320. Id. at 1442-43. 
 321. See Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Summary Judgment and the Influence of Federal 
Rulemaking, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1107, 1117 (2010) (observing that the Enabling Act process, as a 
practical matter, requires consensus, and that it has become most effective when it “codifies existing 
practice, makes stylistic changes that consciously avoid change to content, makes housekeeping or 
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2. Justice Stevens, in Concurrence, Espouses Avoidance Based on 
Serious Doubts Regarding Rule Validity  
Justice Stevens joined the portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion that 
discussed avoidance in dicta, but, in his separate concurrence, he also 
amplified his views on avoidance and developed a broader avoidance 
principle that incorporates a serious doubts methodology.323  Like Justice 
Scalia, Justice Stevens began his analysis with the traditional Hanna 
acknowledgement that REA issues under Erie present two questions:  (1) 
whether the scope of a Federal Rule is “‘sufficiently broad’” to “‘control 
the issue’ . . ., thereby leaving no room for the operation” of apparently 
conflicting state law;324 and (2) if so, whether the Rule is valid, i.e., 
constitutional and in compliance with the substantive rights limitation of 
the REA.325  Justice Stevens, however, concluded that both inquiries can 
be relevant to the scope of a Federal Rule.  He reasoned that if a Federal 
Rule appears to violate the substantive rights proviso, the second 
“substantive rights” inquiry might “bleed back into the first”326 and 
counsel a narrower construction of the Federal Rule that would avoid a 
clash of Federal Rule and state law: 
When a federal rule appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a 
substantive right, federal courts must consider whether the rule can 
reasonably be interpreted to avoid that impermissible result. . . . And 
when such a “saving” construction is not possible and the rule would 
violate the Enabling Act, federal courts cannot apply the rule.327 
This formulation adopts the broader doubts model of avoidance, 
advising avoidance when it appears that a Rule will impermissibly 
 
claims processing changes, as with the recent time computation amendments, or alters Rules in 
ways that can otherwise be reached by consensus”). 
 322. See, e.g., Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 20, at 890; Burbank, supra note 
54, at 1737-42; Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found:  Redefining the Judiciary’s 
Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1234-36, 1247-48 (1996); McCabe, supra 
note 227, at 1687; Subrin, supra note 72, at 404-05. 
 323. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448-50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 324. Id. at 1451 (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987); Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 & n.9 (1980)).   
 325. Id. at 1449, 1451. 
 326. Id. at 1452. 
 327. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 
503 (2001); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842, 845 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-13 (1997)). 
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impact substantive rights,328 without requiring the Court to determine 
that, in fact, the construction of the Rule would violate the substantive 
rights limitation (a position that Justice Scalia seems to prefer in his 
discussion of avoidance in Shady Grove329).  Justice Stevens joins his 
serious doubts model of avoidance with an acknowledgment that the 
substantive rights limitation creates a more substantial hurdle than 
Congress’s authority to create rules that are “‘rationally capable of 
classification’ as procedure.”330  The Court has used the serious doubts 
avoidance canon in prior REA cases.331  It has also used a serious doubts 
avoidance model to assist in policing ambiguous delegations of 
authority332 and to assist in policing constitutional and statutory 
 
 328. Id. at 1452 & n.6 (citing Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842, 845; Amchem, 
521 U.S. at 612-13).  Justice Stevens does not apply the avoidance canon he suggests in Shady 
Grove because he finds the state law to be procedural.  Id. at 1459-60.  Thus, he also does not 
discuss the interpretive methodology a court should use in interpreting Federal Rules.  In Section IV 
of this Article, I suggest that courts, in determining if a saving construction is available, should 
consider the text and the history and purpose of a Rule as evidenced in the Advisory Committee 
Notes and other materials.  Compare Struve, supra note 59, at 1124-42, 1147 (suggesting that 
Supreme Court should “give[] authoritative weight to the Advisory Committee Notes”), with 
Moore, supra note 10, at 1047-53 (proposing that Supreme Court use an active or dynamic method 
of interpreting Federal Rules).  See also Marcus, supra note 253, at 48-51 (suggesting that Advisory 
Committee Notes would occupy a “first tier” of Advisory Committee materials that a court should 
consider in Rule construction, but that a court should also consider other Advisory Committee 
reports and documents regarding the history and purpose of a Rule); Burbank & Wolff, supra note 
59, at 48-49 (suggesting, for open-textured Rules in which the rulemakers have not made policy 
choices that Congress has had a chance to review, that the Court may rely on its federal common 
lawmaking powers in interpreting the Rule). 
 329. See supra notes 310-15 and accompanying text. 
 330. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448-51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  Justice Stevens also determined that Congress’s delegation of rulemaking authority to 
the Court, rather than to a political branch, evidenced Congress’s intent to hold Federal Rules to a 
more stringent standard of validity than the standard applied to congressional statutes.  Id. at 1451. 
 331. See, e.g., Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842, 845; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
612-13; Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1991); see also Daily Income 
Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 542-44 & n.2 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); accord 
Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.), rev’d, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 332. Frickey, supra note 195, at 461-62.  Use of the serious doubts canon in Rule interpretation 
differs from its use to construe a statute narrowly to avoid constitutional violations.  In the statutory 
context, the Court is construing a statute of Congress and may, in avoiding a constitutional decision, 
find the statute inapplicable in a manner tantamount to finding it unconstitutional.  Avoidance, thus, 
permits a court to find a statute inapplicable as a subconstitutional manner and may deny statutory 
application when a straightforward decision would have determined the application of the statute at 
issue to be constitutional.  In the Rule interpretation context, by contrast, avoidance means that the 
Supreme Court will find its own Rule inapplicable and will construe Congress’s delegation to it 
more narrowly, in furtherance of Congress’s limitation on Court rulemaking.  This self-limiting 
action of the Court in prospective rulemaking is less suspect than avoidance in the statutory context, 
but it may interfere with Congress’s second goal for rulemaking—the creation of uniform and 
consistent procedure for the federal court system. 
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boundaries that are, like the substantive rights limitation, characterized 
by difficult line-drawing decisions and, thus, can lead to 
underenforcement of structural norms, such as separations of powers.333     
Under Justice Stevens’s serious doubts conception of avoidance, if 
a Rule appears to be in violation of the substantive rights limitation and 
a narrow construction is available, a collision of Federal Rule and state 
law will be averted, and the court would use an RDA analysis under 
Erie.334  When however, “such a ‘saving’ construction is not possible 
and the rule would violate the Enabling Act, federal courts cannot apply 
the rule.”335  Importantly, Justice Stevens concludes that it is through a 
combination of an application of avoidance when available and finding a 
Federal Rule invalid when necessary that a court demonstrates 
“sensitivity to important state interests” and “regulatory policies.”336  For 
Justice Stevens, then, respect for “important state interests” and 
“regulatory policies” no longer drives a court’s decision to avoid a 
conflict,337 except in the “rare” instances in which state procedural law 
“is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or remedies.”338  
Instead, respect for “important state interests” and “regulatory policies” 
is the result of appropriate application of the substantive rights 
limitation, that is, it is the result of the Court’s construing the Federal 
Rule narrowly to avoid a conflict if such a construction is available, and 
 
 333. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 57, at 171 (noting the use of avoidance to protect values that 
may be underenforced); Young, supra note 57, at 1552-53, 1603-08 (indicating that avoidance 
canons are particularly appropriate when the legal standard is characterized by difficulty of drawing 
bright lines and where avoidance can help prevent “confrontations between the courts and political 
branches”). 
 334. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 1452. 
 337. Justice Scalia also has disavowed reliance on “important state interests” and “regulatory 
policies” as the guiding principle of avoidance.  See supra note 311 and accompanying text.   
 338. Justice Stevens emphasizes that Federal Rules will still be interpreted with  
some degree of “sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies” . . . and 
applied to diversity cases against the background of Congress’ command that such rules 
not alter substantive rights and with consideration of “the degree to which the rule makes 
the character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow in 
state courts.”   
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449, 1454 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (citations omitted).  He would limit the instances in which state law would influence a 
court’s decision to avoid a conflict to those cases in which “the state law actually is part of a State’s 
framework of substantive rights or remedies.”  Id.   
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the Court’s corresponding willingness to find a Rule invalid when 
necessary.339  
Justice Stevens also defined the substantive rights limitation more 
broadly than Justice Scalia, and that broader reach is integral to his 
conclusion that proper application of the substantive rights limitation 
produces the respect for state substantive rights that Congress requires in 
the REA.  For Justice Stevens, a Federal Rule violates the substantive 
rights limitation of the REA if it displaces a state law that is “procedural 
in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or 
remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.”340  
In applying his framework, however, Justice Stevens stopped short 
of using his carefully considered avoidance canon of interpretation 
because he determined that the state law was procedural only.341  Justice 
Stevens concedes that one could argue, as the dissent did, that “class 
certification [in the face of CPLR § 901(b)’s prohibition on class 
actions] would enlarge New York’s ‘limited’ damages remedy”342 and, 
thus, that § 901(b) served both procedural and substantive purposes.  In 
fact, Justice Stevens concluded that there are “two plausible competing 
narratives” regarding § 901(b)—one narrative that would present § 
901(b) as a procedural rule intertwined with a state right or remedy and, 
thus, as a rule that would function to define the scope of the state-created 
right343 and a second narrative that would define § 901(b) as procedural 
only.344  In light of the two competing narratives, however, Justice 
Stevens found it “obvious” that the Court should “respect the plain 
textual reading of § 901(b).”345  That is, the Court should read § 901(b) 
 
 339. Justice Stevens realigns a court’s use of “sensitivity to important state interests” and 
“regulatory policies” from relying on it to guide avoidance to recognizing it as the result of abiding 
by the REA requirement that a Rule not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”: 
A federal rule, therefore, cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would 
displace a state law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined 
with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.  
And absent a governing federal rule, a federal court must engage in the traditional Rules 
of Decision Act inquiry, under the Erie line of cases.  This application of the Enabling 
Act shows “sensitivity to important state interests,” . . . and “regulatory policies,” . . . 
but it does so as Congress authorized, by ensuring that federal rules that ordinarily 
“prescribe general rules of practice and procedure,” § 2072(a), do not “abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 
Id. at 1452 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 340. Id.  
 341. Id. at 1457-60.  
 342. Id. at 1459. 
 343. Id. at 1459-60. 
 344. Id. at 1457-59. 
 345. Id. at 1459-60.   
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as procedural only.  In the potential clash of a Federal Rule and a purely 
procedural state requirement, of course, a Federal Rule will not abridge, 
enlarge or modify a substantive right and there is, correspondingly, no 
need to construe the Federal Rule narrowly.  After developing a more 
sensitive avoidance canon for the REA analysis, Justice Stevens’s 
opinion is disappointing in that it (1) fails to make a contextual 
examination of Rule 23(b), including examination of history and 
Advisory Committee materials, to determine if, in fact, the Rule was 
intended to be mandatory at the plaintiff’s option; and (2) opts for an 
unnecessarily restrictive reading of state law.  Although the purpose of 
this Article is not to resolve conclusively the clash between Rule 23(b) 
and § 901(b), Justice Stevens’s conclusion that there are two competing 
narratives regarding § 901(b) is premised on a less than convincing plain 
meaning construction of § 901(b) and a similarly unconvincing 
conclusion that class action joinder is “classically procedural,” and 
analogous to setting filing fees or briefing deadlines.346   
B. Justice Ginsburg and Avoidance Based on Respect for Important 
State Interests 
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and 
Alito, Justice Ginsburg discusses avoidance based on an accommodation 
or interest balancing approach to avoiding conflict.347  She also states 
that the Court’s prior opinions have incorporated an interest balancing 
approach to avoiding conflict:  “In our prior decisions on point, . . . we 
have avoided immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would 
trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal 
interest.”348  Avoidance, for Justice Ginsburg, springs directly from 
federalism concerns349 and is not ostensibly limited by the substantive 
rights prohibition of the REA, at least not on a conception of the 
prohibition as serving separation of powers interests.  Indeed, the dissent 
emphasizes repeatedly that the Court has adopted and should continue to 
 
 346. Id. at 1457-59. 
 347. Id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
 348. Id.  Justice Ginsburg also references several times an article by former California Supreme 
Court Justice Roger J. Traynor entitled, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657, 
668-69 (1959), in which Justice Traynor recommended an interest balancing approach to 
reconciling potentially conflicting state laws.  In language similar to that used by Justice Ginsburg 
in Shady Grove, Justice Traynor counseled that “courts must be on the alert against making 
exceptions . . . that would defeat a legitimate interest of the forum state without serving the interest 
of  any other state.”  Traynor, supra, at 669.   
 349. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for 
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 438 & nn.7, 22 (1996)). 
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adopt narrowing constructions of Federal Rules to serve important state 
interests or regulatory policies.350   
The dissenting opinion is also premised in large part on a 
marshalling of cases to establish that the Supreme Court’s pre- and post-
Hanna decisions demonstrate unwavering vigilance in construing 
“Federal Rules to avoid conflict with state laws” and “to avoid conflict 
with important state regulatory policies.”351  As discussed above, the 
Erie cases do not line up uniformly in support of any brand of avoidance 
canon.  Avoidance in pre-Hanna cases sought to protect the Federal 
Rules, not important state interests.352  Avoidance in post-Hanna cases 
has varied, but has been based primarily on protecting important state 
interests and regulatory policies.353  Allowing an unbounded concept of 
“state interest” to guide avoidance,354 however, rather than the REA’s 
focus on abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive rights, risks 
returning to the pre-Byrd and pre-Hanna position of elevating, Rule by 
Rule, the states’ authority over congressional power in matters of federal 
procedure.  Thus, rather than an unadorned interest balancing approach 
to avoidance,355 avoidance should be based on the nature and extent of a 
Federal Rule’s impact on substantive law and on plausible 
interpretations of the Rule at issue.     
 
 350. Id. at 1461-64. 
 351. Id. at 1462-63. 
 352. As demonstrated above, in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) and Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Court used avoidance to protect the 
Federal Rule, at issue, not to avoid trenching on state prerogatives.  See supra notes 92-155 and 
accompanying text.  The pre-Hanna case of Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 
U.S. 530 (1949) was construed in Hanna to be premised on avoidance, but at the time of its 
issuance, the case was uniformly construed as one in which state law prevailed over the Federal 
Rule, under outcome-determinative principles, and it seemed, moreover, to toll the death knell of 
the Federal Rules in diversity actions.  The use of avoidance in Ragan thus, would also have 
protected the Federal Rule, as a formal matter, not state interests.  Pre-Hanna avoidance, thus, 
provides scant support for a contemporary avoidance canon premised on protection of state interests 
and regulatory policies.   
 353. See supra notes 188-222 and accompanying text. 
 354. As Justice Stevens recognized, “[t]he Enabling Act’s limitation does not mean that federal 
rules cannot displace state policy judgments; it means only that federal rules cannot displace a 
State’s definition of its own rights or remedies.”  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Only once and indirectly, in quoting Professor 
Ely, does Justice Ginsburg concede that “it is relevant ‘whether the state provision embodies a 
substantive policy or represents only a procedural disagreement with the federal rulemakers 
respecting the fairest and most efficient way of conducting litigation.’”  Id. at 1466 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Ely, supra note 15, at 722). 
 355. By contrast, in his suggestion for use of a comparative impairment approach to avoidance, 
Professor Lynch would limit the approach to instances in which there is a strong likelihood that the 
state interest might affect substantive rights – potential conflicts of Federal Rules and state litigation 
reform law.  See generally Lynch, supra note 37, at 324-26. 
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IV.  SERIOUS DOUBTS AS AN APPROPRIATE MODEL FOR  
AVOIDANCE UNDER THE REA 
Because the Court has failed to settle on either a consistent 
methodology or an appropriate guiding principle for avoidance, its 
avoidance jurisprudence in Enabling Act cases has been uneven and has 
approached the murky quality so often associated with the Erie doctrine.  
In this Section, I recognize, first, that avoidance should be based on 
separation of powers constraints and, propose, second, that it be based 
on the serious doubts model of avoidance that the Court has often used 
in REA cases.  The methodology for avoidance would, thus, be akin to 
that proffered by Justice Stevens in Shady Grove,356 but the Court should 
limit the range of permissible narrowing constructions of a Federal Rule 
to those that can be supported by consideration of Rule text and Rule 
history and purposes, as set forth in Advisory Committee Notes and 
other Advisory Committee sources.357  This limitation on permissible 
saving constructions will prevent ad hoc avoidance and “rewriting” of 
Federal Rules, but, in cases of serious doubt regarding Rule validity, it 
will give the nod to protecting Congress’s superior substantive 
lawmaking authority.  Moreover, if no limiting construction is available, 
the framework requires the court to address Rule validity. 
Any avoidance canon that will assist in defining the substantive 
rights limitation of the REA must recognize that the limitation enforces a 
separation of powers boundary that allocates prospective rulemaking 
authority to the Supreme Court but reserves substantive lawmaking 
choices to Congress.358  Thus, the Court should acknowledge that the 
REA’s prohibition on Rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right” protects against Court Rules that would intrude on 
Congress’s substantive lawmaking prerogative.  Professor Burbank’s 
germinal article uncovering the historical foundations of the REA 
reveals the separation of powers origin of the substantive rights 
limitation.359  As Professor Burbank has emphasized, however, 
federalism interests are served by the REA’s allocation of power 
between the Supreme Court and Congress, but, as “a probable effect, 
rather than the primary purpose of the allocation scheme established by 
the [Rules Enabling] Act.”360  The REA’s date of enactment—four years 
 
 356. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 357. See infra notes 380-89 and accompanying text. 
 358. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1025-26. 
 359. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1025-26, 1106-07. 
 360. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1025-26.  Professor Burbank stated as follows: 
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before the Erie decision—also supports that the purpose was not to 
protect directly federalism interests.361  Thus, a court grappling with 
whether a Rule complies with the substantive rights limitation weighs 
competing federal interests—Congress’s interest in protecting its 
substantive lawmaking authority and Congress’s intent that the Federal 
Rules be uniform, predictable, and simple. 
The recognition that the substantive rights limitation protects 
against Court intrusion into substantive lawmaking choices of Congress 
means that “sensitivity to important state interests” and “important state 
regulatory policies” cannot be the guiding principle for avoidance.  Five 
justices in Shady Grove recognize the illegitimacy of unlimited reliance 
on these factors,362  but the four dissenting justices are insistent that the 
Court should interpret Federal Rules with “awareness of, and sensitivity 
to, important state regulatory policies”363 and “important state 
 
The relevant substantive rights under the [Rules Enabling] Act, however, are not . . . 
those that reflect existing state substantive policy choices on the same subject covered by 
a Federal Rule.  The purpose of the procedure/substance dichotomy is not to protect state 
or federal policy choices on such matters, although it may have that effect.  Its purpose 
is, rather, to allocate policy choices – to determine which federal lawmaking body, the 
Court or Congress, shall decide whether there will be federally enforceable rights 
regarding the matter in question and the content of those rights. 
Burbank, supra note 23, at 1113. 
 361. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1108-12.  See also Ely, supra note 15, at 720-21 (“It is true 
that there is no evidence to suggest that those responsible for the passage of the Enabling Act—
which was finally enacted in 1934 (four years before Erie) after many years of skirmishing—had 
the Rules of Decision Act in mind as a guide to the boundaries of the Supreme Court’s rulemaking 
authority.”). 
 362. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1441 n.7 
(2010) (majority opinion).  Justice Scalia observed as follows: 
The dissent also suggests that we should read the Federal Rules “‘with sensitivity to 
important state interests’” and “‘to avoid conflict with important state regulatory 
policies.’” . . . The search for state interests and policies that are “important” is just as 
standardless as the “important or substantial” criterion we rejected in Sibbach v. Wilson. 
. . .  
Id.  Justice Stevens, in his separate concurrence, limits, rather than rejects, the application of state 
interests.  Justice Stevens emphasizes that Federal Rules will still be interpreted with  
some degree of “sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies” . . . and 
applied to diversity cases against the background of Congress’ command that such rules 
not alter substantive rights and with consideration of  “the degree to which the Rule 
makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would 
follow in state courts.”  
Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).  
Justice Stevens would limit the instances in which state law would influence a court’s decision to 
avoid a conflict to those cases in which “the state law actually is part of a State’s framework of 
substantive rights or remedies.”  Id.   
 363. Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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interests.”364  Moreover, one searches the majority and concurring 
opinions in vain for a direct statement that separation of powers interests 
animate the substantive rights limitation.  Using state interests, and 
certainly the unbounded state interests discussed in the Shady Grove 
dissent,365 as the controlling principle of avoidance elevates state power 
regarding federal procedure over the authority of both Congress and its 
delegate, the Supreme Court.  Strikingly, it threatens to create, not as a 
general principle, but Rule-by-Rule, a legal climate eerily similar to the 
pre-Byrd and pre-Hanna outcome-determinative period.  In the outcome-
determinative period, state law seemed to override the Federal Rules, 
and the Court created dual meanings for Federal Rules, one of which 
would apply in diversity cases and the other in federal question cases.366  
 
 364. Id. at 1463. 
 365. Id. at 1460-61, 1463-64. 
 366. In both cases in the outcome-determinative era and current cases, the Court has construed 
Federal Rules differently when in potential conflict with state law – often construing Federal Rules 
against their plain language to avoid a conflict with state law, but construing the Federal Rules more 
in line with their plain language when in conflict with federal law.  Commentators from both eras 
have noted and disparaged this tendency.  See, e.g., Gavit, supra note 30, at 3.  Professor Gavit 
stated as follows: 
[T]he most recent cases have applied an extended version of the doctrine of Erie as 
against the Federal Rules; and those cases appear to warrant the broad statement that in a 
diversity case, in the event of a conflict between a state rule of procedure and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal district court must apply the state rule and not the 
federal rule if the state advantage is claimed to be one of “substantial importance.”  It 
appears to be conceded on all fronts that in litigation involving federal law the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be administered under the usual standards of 
interpretation.  They are procedure in those cases; yet they are “substance” in a diversity 
case. 
Id.; Merrigan, supra note 30, at 719.  Merrigan similarly concluded as follows: 
It is noteworthy that the Court also held in the Ragan case that Rule 3 still prevails in 
cases involving only a federal question.  In such a case, irrespective of state 
requirements, the action is still commenced and the applicable statute of limitations 
tolled by the mere filing of the complaint.  In sum and substance, therefore, the Court 
delimited Rule 3 in diversity of citizenship cases, but preserved it for all other types of 
civil actions.  As a result, all “strictly federal” cases will now be governed by Rule 3, 
while diversity cases must of necessity be commenced in accordance with prevailing 
state law. 
Id.  (citations omitted); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 743-44.  Professors Dudley and 
Rutherglen concluded as follows: 
The most frequently felt temptation—at least at the Supreme Court level—is to construe 
federal law narrowly to avoid a conflict with state law.  This was certainly the temptation 
to which the Court succumbed in Walker, Gasperini, and Semtek . . . .  The . . . unhappy 
outcome is illustrated by Walker and West, where supposedly uniform federal procedural 
rules become two-headed monsters meaning different things depending on whether the 
plaintiff’s claim is based on state or federal law. 
Id.; Struve, supra note 59, at 1150-51 (concluding that “to the extent the Court views the Enabling 
Act limitation as serving federalism, and not separation of powers, concerns . . . , the Court’s 
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Ultimately, an unbounded interest balancing approach based on 
important state interests treats the Federal Rule and state law as though 
they were adopted by co-equal sovereigns.  It permits the law serving the 
“greater” interest to control or permits an accommodation of the two 
laws, but it ignores the constitutional superiority of federal law in event 
of conflict and, as applied, it has also minimized the federal interest in 
creating a uniform national procedure.367 
The teaching of Hanna is to the contrary—Congress’s delegation of 
rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court combined with the 
Supremacy Clause’s elevation of federal law over state law require that 
Federal Rules will preempt some interests and regulatory policies that 
are important to states.  Similarly, the supersession clause of the REA 
permits Federal Rules that do not impact substantive rights 
impermissibly to supersede congressional statutes.368  The Federal 
Rules, then, do not operate only when nonconflicting or when in conflict 
with “unimportant” federal or state law, but have real power to override 
laws of both Congress and the states, as long as the Rules do not impact 
impermissibly substantive rights.  Furthermore, the REA cases have 
demonstrated that there is no identity principle of separation of powers 
and federalism in construing the substantive rights limitation.  That is, 
use of a separation of powers principle that prevents Court Rules from 
intruding impermissibly into Congress’s substantive policy choices 
(including Congress’s decision that there be no governing federal law) 
will protect against impermissible intrusion into substantive state law as 
a residual matter.  Use of federalism principles as the touchstone for 
avoidance, however, will not protect Congress’s interests in permitting 
the Supreme Court to establish uniform procedural Rules for the federal 
courts but ensuring no impermissible intrusion into substantive policy 
choices of Congress.  Instead, a federalism focus for avoidance permits 
subordination of federal policy choices to state law and permits differing 
interpretations of the Rules in diversity and federal question cases.  
Thus, rather than ensuring protection of the separation of powers 
boundary in the face of difficult line drawing issues, use of important 
 
avoidance doctrine can produce Rules that have one meaning in diversity cases and another in 
federal question cases”).     
 367. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 23, at 1024, 1040-45, 1084-85 & n.298 (discussing 
legislative history of proposed bills that were the forerunners of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 in 
order to shed light on the REA); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 743-44, 747-48; Hill, 
supra note 30, at 582-83; McCoid, supra note 40, at 898 & n.62. 
 368. For articles discussing the supersession clause of the REA, which permits Federal Rules to 
supersede congressional statutes if in compliance with the substantive rights limitation, see supra 
note 10. 
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state interests and regulatory policies to guide avoidance may permit 
state law to override valid Federal Rules.369  
Reorienting the focus of avoidance to key on preventing Court 
Rules from impermissibly abridging Congress’s substantive policy 
choices would be a good first step in establishing the proper role of 
avoidance in Enabling Act cases.  With five justices rejecting unlimited 
“sensitivity to important state interests” and “important state regulatory 
policies” as the basis for limiting Federal Rules, perhaps the Shady 
Grove case has taken that first step.  There is, in Shady Grove, however, 
no direct statement that separation of powers concerns animate the 
substantive rights limitation.  The second step in according avoidance its 
proper role in defining the substantive rights limitation is to invoke 
serious doubts avoidance and to establish a workable definition for the 
substantive-procedural divide.  Although identification of that workable 
definition is beyond the scope of this Article, an administrable standard 
is essential to a serious doubts analysis because the serious doubts 
avoider must consider whether there is a serious doubt regarding Rule 
validity (though she need not definitely resolve the issue of Rule 
validity) before turning to possible limiting constructions for a Federal 
Rule.   
Justice Stevens recommended serious doubts avoidance in his 
concurrence in Shady Grove, stating that the second phase of the Hanna 
inquiry regarding Rule validity “may well bleed back into the first,” i.e., 
determination of Rule scope370:  “When a federal rule appears to abridge, 
enlarge, or modify a substantive right, federal courts must consider 
whether the rule can reasonably be interpreted to avoid that 
impermissible result.”371  Serious doubts avoidance based on separation 
of powers constraints would favor a restrained reading of a Rule, when 
such an interpretation is available, to limit tensions between the Supreme 
Court and Congress caused by the Court’s exceeding the substantive 
rights limitation.372  The Supreme Court has also used a serious doubts 
 
 369. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).  See Burbank, 
supra note 23, at 1042-46. 
 370. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (citations omitted); see also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 543-44 & n.2 
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (considering a congressional statute-Federal Rule 
conflict). 
 371. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452. 
 372. See supra note 332, indicating that use of a serious doubts avoidance principle in Rule 
interpretation is less problematic than in narrow construction of a statute to avoid an 
unconstitutional result.  In providing a narrowing construction of a Rule that varies from the most 
natural interpretation of the Rule, the Court is self-limiting its own Rule in order to comply with 
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model in other REA cases.373  Under the serious doubts model, the first-
step analysis of scope of the Federal Rule, will involve a look at the 
second-step Rule validity analysis.  The doubts principle, thus, assumes 
a shared understanding of the Rule validity standard at issue, but that the 
standard may involve difficult line drawing issues.   
The crisper the standard for Rule validity and the easier it is for 
courts to apply the standard, the more, theoretically, serious doubts 
avoidance will play a supporting role, rather than a leading role, in 
defining the substantive rights divide.  Further, the clearer the standard 
for dividing substance and procedure, the more the Court may invoke 
classical or narrow avoidance, as Justice Scalia suggests in Shady Grove.  
The clear standard of Hanna, however, which seemed to provide 
insufficient protection for state law, has historically had the opposite 
effect, causing the Court to search for avenues to avoid apparent 
conflicts, which would, in turn, permit application of the state-protective 
RDA analysis.  Thus, the Court’s avoidance cases have demonstrated 
that an appropriate standard must not only be clear or easily 
administrable to reduce reliance on avoidance techniques, it must also be 
sufficiently nuanced to include meaningful consideration of all relevant 
interests.  Justice Scalia’s proposed clear and easily administrable “really 
regulates procedure” standard for Rule validity in Shady Grove, thus, 
may paradoxically lead, yet again, to increased reliance on avoidance 
techniques.374   
As the standard for defining the substantive rights limit of the REA 
becomes less clear and line-drawing more difficult, of course, courts 
would turn more often to avoidance, and here I recommend serious 
doubts avoidance, which has proved effective in dealing with standards 
characterized by difficulty in line-drawing.375  With the REA’s dual 
 
Congress’s separation of powers constraint, rather than narrowing a statute of Congress, which has 
superior lawmaking authority and is a democratically elected body.  Although the narrowing of a 
Federal Rule may threaten Congress’s additional goal in enacting the REA—that the Supreme Court 
create uniform and consistent Rules for the federal procedural system—it does so in service of 
Congress’s separation of powers goal that also animates Congress’s delegation of rulemaking 
authority to the Court. 
 373. See McCoid, supra note 40, at 898 & n.62.  Professor McCoid observed that the interest in 
the integrity of the federal system that is a formative purpose of the Federal Rules and that is 
emphasized in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965), is not uniformly evidenced in each 
Rule.  McCoid, supra note 40, at 898 & n.62.  He concluded, in fact, that the interest in “unity of the 
rules” was not at issue in the case of the service Rule at issue in Hanna.  McCoid, supra note 40, at 
898 & n.62.  That is, the federal system could tolerate and, in fact, the Rules provided for, varying 
methods of service.  
 374. See supra text accompanying notes 322-23. 
 375. See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text. 
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interests in protecting substantive rights and protecting the integrity of a 
uniform federal procedure for the independent federal court system, it is 
likely that the Court will ultimately opt for a standard that does not in all 
cases permit a bright line determination of whether a Rule satisfies the 
substantive rights limitation.  Indeed, the Court has demonstrated little 
satisfaction with the bright line tests it has used in the past—from 
outcome determination to “really regulates procedure”376 to sensitivity to 
important state interests377 (and, for four justices, back again to “really 
regulates procedure”378).  But the ability to interpret a Rule narrowly to 
avoid a conflict with apparently substantive law must have limits if 
avoidance is to serve the purpose of protecting the separation of powers 
boundary established in the REA, and if, additionally, the Rules are to be 
construed uniformly in diversity and federal question cases. 
Those limits can be found by further analogy to the statutory 
avoidance canon.  A “cardinal principle” of the statutory avoidance 
canon is that when Congress’s intent is clear, that intent, rather than a 
limiting interpretation, must govern.379  And, if there is no permissible 
“saving” construction, the Court must address the constitutional issue.  
So, too, in the REA context, the Supreme Court has often stated, when 
analogizing to a serious doubts model, that a limiting construction of a 
Federal Rule may be appropriate, but only “when it is fair to [construe 
narrowly].”380  Indeed, Justice Stevens, in his Shady Grove concurrence, 
 
 376. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965). 
 377. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7, 437 & n.22 
(1996); see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-05 (2001). 
 378. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010) 
(Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.). 
 379. See, e.g., Young, supra note 57, at 1576; see also supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 380. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (indicating that courts should “assume . . . when it is fair to do so, that Congress is just 
as concerned as [the Court has been] . . . to avoid significant differences between state and federal 
courts in adjudicating claims” and that limiting constructions may be used “if the text permits”); 
accord Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (stating that a limiting construction may be adopted when “the rule can reasonably be 
interpreted to avoid that impermissible result”); id. at 1441-42  (majority opinion) (recognizing, in 
dicta that a Rule may be narrowed to serve avoidance purposes if “susceptible of two meanings” but 
finding, on the facts of the case, that the Rule was unambiguous and in direct conflict with state 
law); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842-45 (1999) (construing Rule more 
narrowly than text would require in light of “historical antecedents,” the “Advisory Committee’s 
expressions of understanding,” and potential invalidity of Rule under the substantive rights 
limitation of the REA); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-13, 620 (1997) 
(providing that a Rule’s “requirements must be interpreted in keeping with . . . the Rules Enabling 
Act, which instructs that rules of procedure ‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right’” and also that, in construing a Rule, courts “must be mindful that the Rule as now composed 
sets the requirements they are bound to enforce”); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 
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has once again concluded that, if a “rule can[not] reasonably be 
interpreted” to avoid arguable violation of the substantive rights 
limitation, then the Court must address whether the Rule is valid under 
the REA.381   
Unfortunately, the Court has been less than consistent in 
determining when a narrowing construction would be “fair” or 
“reasonable” and has often declined to examine Rule history and 
purposes as revealed in Advisory Committee Notes and other sources 
when determining the appropriate reach of a Rule.382  Commentators 
have made a persuasive case that Rules should be interpreted in light of 
text and Advisory Committee Notes and other Advisory Committee 
documentation regarding history and purpose.  Structurally, the case for 
reliance on Advisory Committee Notes has increased since the Notes 
have been subjected to additional procedures in the rulemaking process, 
including that both the Rule text and Notes are submitted for public 
comment, both are subject to revision by the Advisory Committee and 
the Standing Committee, and both are submitted to the Supreme Court 
and Congress for approval.383  Furthermore, the Enabling Act process 
 
543-44 & n.2 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that plain language and history of 
Rule supported construing Rule narrowly and not to conflict with a federal statute in the face of 
substantial doubt about the validity under the REA of a contrary construction). 
 381. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 382. See, e.g., Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04; Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 742-43 
& nn.3-4 (1980); see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436-37 & n.22 (Court fails to address conflict 
issue until late in the case and makes no inquiry into context as provided in Advisory Committee 
materials); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (in congressional statute-Federal Rule conflict, 
Court majority makes no inquiry into history of Rule, but uses a plain meaning construction that 
later research reveals to be inconsistent with Rule history and Advisory Committee Notes, see Bone, 
To Encourage Settlement, supra note 20, at 1615); but see Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842-45 (interpreting 
Rule in light of “historical antecedents” and the “Advisory Committee’s expressions of 
understanding” regarding the Rule); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 612-13, 620 (reminding that “the Rule as 
now composed sets the requirements [courts] are bound to enforce”); Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. 
at 543-44 & n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (construing Rule narrowly and not to conflict 
with congressional statute, but also providing a saving construction that comported with the Rule’s 
text and history). 
 383. Struve, supra note 59, at 1112-14.  See also Marcus, supra note 253, at 48-49 (ranking 
Advisory Committee Notes in the “first tier” of Rule history materials that courts should review 
when seeking the meaning of a Federal Rule, but also advocating use of a broad range of materials 
that comprise the rulemaking history of a Federal Rule); Sellers, supra note 282, at 328-29.  
Alternatively, Professors Burbank and Wolff suggest a “more dynamic approach” to interpreting 
Federal Rules that would recognize “the actual policy choices that Federal Rules make and that 
Congress had an opportunity to review” but would also recognize that the Court’s power to interpret 
Federal Rules extends to federal common lawmaking when the Federal Rules are “open-ended,” 
“discretionary,” and “leave actual choices to federal trial judges.”    Burbank & Wolff, supra note 
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includes broad input, multiple decisionmakers, notice and comment 
periods, and opportunity for review by the Supreme Court and 
Congress.384  Indeed, Professor Bone has concluded that Hanna’s 
presumption of Rule validity is based on the “idea that the Rule has been 
vetted by the rulemaking process” and, thus, Rule interpretations that are 
not “sufficiently connected to the Rule as so vetted” should not be 
deemed presumptively valid.385  Similarly, the Court’s failure to stay 
close to Rule text, history, and purposes as set forth in Advisory 
Committee Notes and other materials in applying an avoidance canon in 
Erie cases has permitted dueling interpretations of a single Rule in 
diversity and nondiversity cases.386     
Pragmatically, the Court should also use text and Advisory 
Committee materials to constrain the range of permissible saving 
constructions when using avoidance in Erie cases because the Court has 
often relied on those sources in other REA contexts;387 because using 
different techniques for Rule interpretation in varying REA contexts 
leads to the “two plain meanings for Federal Rules” problem (one in 
diversity and one in federal question cases), experienced both in the 
outcome-determinative period and currently; and because, when it has 
not used these materials, the Court has permitted implausible Rule 
interpretations in both Erie and non-Erie, REA cases.388  
Additionally, while I advocate attention to Rule interpretation for 
the limited purpose of restraining the range of permissible saving 
constructions that courts may adopt for Federal Rules, other 
commentators have suggested that attention to history and Advisory 
Committee context in Rule interpretation may, in fact, reveal enhanced 
Federal Rule competence, thereby potentially restricting the need to 
resort to avoidance principles.  Thus, assessing Rule text and history as 
set forth in Advisory Committee materials may assist both in cabining 
 
59, at 26, 48-49.  Thus, in the context of construing a Federal Rule the Court’s power would 
emanate from the Rules as promulgated and from the Court’s power in federal common lawmaking. 
 384. Struve, supra note 59, at 1112-14; Sellers, supra note 282, at 328-29.  See also Bone, To 
Encourage Settlement, supra note 20, at 1615-17; Marcus, supra note 253, at 5-6, 18-29 
(concluding that “institutional features, relationships, and values implicated [in] rule promulgation 
 . . . explain why courts [should] have an obligation to interpret Federal Rules . . . [by] an 
interpretive method that defers to authorial expectations”). 
 385. Bone, To Encourage Settlement, supra note 20, at 1617. 
 386. See, e.g., Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04; Walker, 446 U.S. at 742-43. 
 387. See supra notes 230-60 and accompanying text. 
 388. See supra notes 189-200, discussing Walker, 446 U.S. 740, and supra notes 214-21, 
discussing Semtek, 531 U.S. 497.  See also Bone, To Encourage Settlement, supra note 20, at 1615-
16 (discussing implausible construction of Rule 68 in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), when 
Court failed to look to history and Advisory Committee materials). 
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the permissible range of limiting constructions of a Rule for avoidance 
purposes and in establishing greater federal authority of a Rule.  For 
example, Professors Dudley and Rutherglen note that Court attention to 
the history and Advisory Committee Notes regarding Rule 59(a), in 
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,389 would have established that 
Rule 59(a) “was no ordinary federal rule . . . but proceeded from the 
command of Congress to avoid any infringement of the right to jury trial 
under the Seventh Amendment.”390  They conclude that, if the Gasperini 
Court had considered the history of Rule 59(a), it might have concluded 
that the Rule incorporated the provisions of a federal statute and that the 
Rule could be accorded the higher level of federal competence accorded 
congressional statutes.391  More broadly, Professors Burbank and Wolff 
have suggested that the Court’s promulgation of open-textured Rules 
that leave normative choices to trial courts may provide a role for 
Supreme Court federal common lawmaking in Rule interpretation.392  
In summary, using a serious doubts analysis that tethers any 
limiting constructions of a Federal Rule to its text and its history and 
purposes as revealed in Advisory Committee Notes and other materials 
produces multiple benefits.  First, it will permit the doubts canon to 
protect the often underenforced structural value of separation of powers 
that underlies the REA and that Congress is now quick to patrol.  
Although this Article does not address the Rule validity standard, it is 
likely that any standard adopted by the Supreme Court will present the 
difficult line-drawing issues that are best protected through a doubts 
analysis, since the standard will likely seek to reconcile congressional 
intent to permit a uniform national procedural code for the federal courts 
while retaining for Congress substantive policy choices.  The properly 
limited serious doubts canon will err on the side of protecting 
Congress’s substantive prerogative in instances of serious doubt, but, 
when limited by text, history, and purposes as adduced in the Enabling 
Act process, it will preclude a “rewriting” of the Federal Rule.  If Rule 
text and history do not permit a limiting construction, then the Court 
 
 389. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 390. Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 713-15.  Professors Dudley and Rutherglen 
suggest as well that understanding the history and Advisory Committee information not only 
prevents improper limiting of Rule 59(a), it also establishes that the authority for Rule 59(a) comes 
from Congress itself and, thus, may preclude a need to consider the substantive rights limitation 
since congressional statutes are subject only to constitutional validity requirements.  See also 
Burbank, supra note 23, at 1147-58 (discussing what he referred to as the “incorporation principle” 
in drafting of the original Federal Rules). 
 391. Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 713-16. 
 392. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 59, at 48-49. 
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must proceed to the question of Rule validity.  Second, by protecting 
Congress’s substantive lawmaking choices, the court additionally 
protects federalism interests, but as the result of protecting Congress’s 
substantive policy choices, not as the goal of avoidance.  Third, it will 
protect Court rulemaking.  Unbounded avoidance imposed to serve the 
goal of protecting state interests and regulatory policies permits differing 
interpretations for Federal Rules depending on whether the case is based 
on diversity or federal question jurisdiction and threatens both to alter 
Rules as promulgated through the Enabling Act process and to return to 
the pre-Byrd and pre-Hanna era in which state procedural law was 
elevated above Federal Rules and federal statutes.  Fourth, this serious 
doubts framework harmonizes the methodology for avoidance in Erie 
and non-Erie REA cases because in each REA context—Federal Rule-
state law conflict, congressional statute-Federal Rule conflict, or general 
Rule construction—the same issue of whether the Court Rule impinges 
impermissibly on Congress’s substantive lawmaking prerogative is 
addressed.    
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court has long relied on avoidance to assist in policing the 
uncertain boundary of the substantive rights limitation of the REA, and, 
thus, to decide whether a Federal Rule or state law should prevail in 
event of an apparent Federal Rule-state law conflict.  The Court’s 
reliance on avoidance, however, has been inconsistent and improperly 
focused on federalism concerns.  This Article suggests that use of 
avoidance remains appropriate, but it narrows instances of reliance on 
avoidance (1) by recognizing that “important state interests and 
regulatory powers” may not serve as the guiding principle of avoidance 
because the substantive rights limitation is premised on separation of 
powers purposes rather than federalism purposes; and (2) by limiting, 
through interpretation based on Rule text and Advisory Committee 
materials, the available saving constructions for a Rule.  Furthermore, 
the proposal to use a serious doubts method of avoidance recognizes the 
competing federal principles under the substantive rights limitation of 
the REA—the integrity of the Federal Rules as a coherent system and 
the preservation to Congress of substantive lawmaking choices.  
Nevertheless, in instances of serious doubt as to whether a Federal Rule 
violates the substantive rights limitation, it recognizes that the REA 
limitation regarding separation of powers is part of the “constitution 
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outside the Constitution”393 and that the constitutional and statutory 
value should be protected.   
 
 
 
 
 393. Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation:  An Essay 
for Phil Frickey, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1372-73, 1380 (2010).   
